University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

2013

Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?
Ellen M. Weber
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, eweber@law.umaryland.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Digital Commons Citation
43 Golden Gate University Law Review 179 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty at
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Weber: Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage

ARTICLE
EQUALITY STANDARDS FOR HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE: WILL THE
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT END THE
DISCRIMINATION?
ELLEN WEBER 
Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act in 2008 to end discriminatory health insurance coverage for persons
with mental health and substance use disorders in large employer health
plans. Adopting a comprehensive regulatory approach akin to that of
other civil rights laws, the Parity Act requires “equity” in all plan
features, including cost-sharing, durational limits and, most critically,
the plan management practices that are used to deny many families
medically necessary behavioral health care. Beginning in 2014, all
health plans regulated by the Affordable Care Act must also comply with
parity standards, effectively ending the second-class insurance status of
persons with these disorders. With the legal framework in place, this
Article examines whether the Parity Act will achieve its promise of
equitable health care coverage. It concludes that two structural
features—the complexity of the Act’s standards and the health plan’s
control of all data needed to assess compliance—render enforcement by
consumers exceedingly difficult. Enforcement is further jeopardized by
the federal regulators’ failure to articulate a standard to implement the
most fundamental aspect of the law—the required scope of behavioral
health services—and to provide sufficient guidance on the law’s most
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contentious provision—regulation of plan management practices. To
address these enforcement limitations, this Article provides a detailed
explanation of the Parity Act’s standards, offers interpretive guidance to
resolve key questions, and recommends implementation strategies to
enhance consumer notification and demonstration of parity compliance.
Additional, yet modest, compliance requirements are needed to ensure
that the Parity Act achieves its remedial goal.
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Dealing equally with health care for mental, substance use, and
general health conditions requires a fundamental change in how we as a
society and health care system think about and respond to these
problems and illnesses. Mental and substance use problems and
illnesses should not be viewed as separate from and unrelated to overall
health and general health care.**
INTRODUCTION
Inequality has long been the defining characteristic in health
insurance coverage for addiction and mental health treatment. Costsharing is frequently higher for addiction and mental health treatment
than for other medical care, limitations on length of care are more
restrictive, and financial caps on a health plan’s annual expenditures for
addiction treatment are common. 1 An individual seeking care for
addiction and mental illness must often obtain the insurer’s approval
even before seeing a clinician and “fail first” in a less expensive level of
care prior to receiving the services the clinician deemed most
appropriate. These standards would cripple the delivery of health care
for other medical conditions. 2

** Harvey V. Fineberg, Inst. of Med., Improving the Quality of Health Care for Mental
and Substance-Use Conditions, at viii (2006).
1
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-95, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT:
DESPITE NEW FEDERAL STANDARDS, MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS REMAIN LIMITED 6-8 (2000),
available at www.gao.gov/assets/240/230309.pdf (describing plan design features that were
common even after the enactment of the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996); Michael Carter &
Robert Landau, Employers Face Challenges with New Mental Health Parity Act, 41 COMP. &
BENEFITS REV. 39, 43-44 (2009) (explaining that typical preferred provider plan coverage for mental
health is “substantially less” than medical benefits coverage because of durational limits on
hospitalization and outpatient care for mental health services and higher cost-sharing).
2
Persons with addiction and mental health conditions are by no means the only individuals
with chronic conditions who experience health insurance barriers to obtaining essential healthcare.
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Against this backdrop, the enactment of the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 3
(Parity Act) was, by any measure, a significant victory in regulating
discriminatory health insurance practices that have barred access to
health care for many people with addiction and mental health disorders.
Fifteen years after the introduction of the first mental health parity bill, 4
Congress began to regulate both the design of health benefits and the
medical management tools that often determine whether a patient will
receive necessary care. The law seeks to end discriminatory insurance
standards that have perpetuated stigma, sacrificed critical care to costcontrol measures, and ignored scientific knowledge demonstrating the
unity of body and mind in matters of health. 5 Whether this law will
succeed in achieving its important goals depends on the proper
enforcement of a complex regulation and the resolution of several key
standards that will define the meaning of equal health coverage and care

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 26-32 (2004) (stating that
health insurance “fails to cover the services persons with disabilities most need for independence and
health,” such as durable equipment and assistive technologies and ongoing rehabilitative therapies to
address chronic, as opposed to acute, conditions). The distinguishing feature for persons with
addiction and mental health disorders is that these conditions have been subject to more restrictive
standards, in large part because they are deemed to be the “fault of” and subject to manipulation by
the patient. Treatment is perceived as having less-objective indicators of a “cure,” and the providers
of such services are deemed to need “oversight” in their clinical judgments. See infra notes 61-69
and accompanying discussion. Thus, individuals who suffer from these conditions are stigmatized
and discounted, as are the healthcare services and practitioners. As described in the legislative
history of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, “[m]ental health and substance abuse
conditions are the only disorders that have been systematically and unfairly excluded from equal
coverage. Unlike mental health, the usual medical/surgical categorical exclusions made by insurers
are for treatments or procedures . . . not for a whole class of diagnoses.” H.R. REP. NO. 110-374(II),
at 15 (2007); cf. Bagenstos, supra, at 29-30 (claiming that although the exclusion and capping of
benefits for persons with mental health conditions is a major problem, private health insurance
adversely affects persons with disabilities more significantly through its emphasis on acute care and
medical necessity standards that require evidence that the service will improve the condition as
opposed to maintain functional capacity).
3
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 511-512, 122
Stat. 3861 (2008).
4
For a history of federal parity legislation, see H.R. REP. NO. 110-374(I), at 13-19 (2007);
Colleen L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health and Addiction Insurance
Parity, 88 MILBANK Q. 404 (2010); Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health
Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
63 (1997) (describing legislative proposals that culminated in the enactment of the Mental Health
Parity Act of 1996); Sonja B. Starr, Simple Fairness: Ending Discrimination in Health Insurance
Coverage of Addiction Treatment, 111 YALE L.J. 2321, 2359-60 (2002) (describing proposed
substance abuse parity legislation).
5
The Surgeon General reported in 1999 that “everyday language tends to encourage a
misperception that ‘mental health’ or ‘mental illness’ is unrelated to ‘physical health’ or ‘physical
illness.’ In fact, the two are inseparable.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL
HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (1999), available at
profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBHS.pdf.
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for mental health and substance use disorders. This Article seeks to
promote an understanding of the Parity Act’s non-discrimination
standards, respond to interpretive gaps that undermine enforcement, and
recommend enforcement strategies that will help achieve the law’s
remedial goals.
The Parity Act requires group health plans 6 to equalize health
benefits for addiction and mental health and medical benefits in many
fundamental ways. First, it specifically prohibits group health plans from
imposing separate or more restrictive financial requirements or treatment
limitations on mental health and substance use disorder benefits.
Second, patients can no longer be denied insurance reimbursement when
they reach an arbitrary lifetime or annual spending cap imposed solely on
mental health or substance use disorder care. 7 While an employer is not
required to offer any health insurance coverage for addiction or mental
health care, 8 the coverage of any service for these disorders renders the
plan subject to the Parity Act in a comprehensive fashion. 9 Third, and
most importantly, the parity regulations impose non-discrimination
standards on medical management practices, medical necessity
determinations, and provider network and compensation practices—
classified as “non-quantitative treatment limitations.” These practices,
which have operated in the shadows to limit access to the most expensive
care, have forced many insured individuals to pay higher costs through
out-of-network care, obtain care in the publicly funded health care

6

The Parity Act regulates health plans offered by large employers, while plans offered in
the “small employer” market—those with fifty or fewer employees—and individual (non-group)
market policies are exempt. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(c)(1) (Westlaw 2012). The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA), however, extends the parity requirements to the individual market for
qualified health plans sold in or outside the Health Benefit Exchange. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§
1311(j), 1562(c)(4), 124 Stat. 119, 181, 265-277 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. Under U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services regulations, the ACA also extends parity requirements to qualified health plans
sold in the small group market. 78 Fed. Reg. 12834 (Feb. 25, 2013). This Article addresses parity
standards related to large group health plans and, by extension under the ACA, qualified health plans
and plans purchased by small employers and individuals.
7
The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 barred annual and lifetime dollar limits for mental
health disorder benefits that were less than the benefit limits for medical care, but it did not extend
this protection to substance use disorder benefits. Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 701702, 712, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944 (1996). The 1996 parity law explicitly allowed group health plans to
impose “cost sharing, limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, and requirements relating to
medical necessity” on mental health disorders (and substance use disorder benefits) even if such
standards were not imposed on other medical benefits. Id. § 712(b)(2). This limited parity
protection was easily circumvented by the benefit designs that are now addressed in the Parity Act.
8
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(b)(1) (Westlaw 2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(b)(1) (Westlaw 2012); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(b)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
9
For a description of the regulatory standards, see infra Part II.
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system, or forgo treatment entirely. 10 Finally, the Parity Act offers a
remedy for health insurance discrimination that was promised, but never
realized, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 11
The true test of any reform legislation, however, is whether it is
operationalized in a way that will effectively remedy the targeted
inequity. 12 Four years after the enactment of the Parity Act, 13 advocates
point to fault lines in enforcement. 14 Federal regulators have yet to
promulgate a final rule for employer-based plans, and the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have issued no rules for
Medicaid managed care plans. The Interim Final Rule (IFR), 15 while
far-reaching, provides incomplete guidance on the non-discrimination
standard for plan management features (e.g., non-quantitative treatment
limitations) and is purposefully silent on whether the law regulates the
“scope of services” that must be offered for mental health and substance
use disorder benefits. 16 The articulation of these standards will
determine whether millions of individuals currently receiving mental

10

Richard G. Frank et al., The Politics and Economics of Mental Health Parity, 16 HEALTH
AFF. 108, 111, 117 (1997); Steven S. Sharfstein, Will Parity in Coverage Result in Better Mental
Health Care?, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1030 (2002). See discussion infra accompanying notes 73-85
and 92-97.
11
See discussion infra accompanying notes 29-43.
12
For example, overly restrictive Supreme Court interpretations of the disability definition
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999);
Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Toyota
Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), eliminated protections for many individuals
that Congress intended to protect. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2,
122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(4)-(7), (b) (Westlaw 2012).
13
The Parity Act applied to health plans for any plan year following October 2009. Pub. L.
No. 110-343, § 512(e), 122 Stat. 3891 (2008). The Interim Final Rule was applicable for plan years
beginning on July 1, 2010. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(i) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(i)
(Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(i) (Westlaw 2013). Thus, for health plans that follow a
calendar year, the law has been fully effective since January 2011.
14
In March 2011, the sponsors of the Parity Act, former Representatives James Ramstad and
Patrick Kennedy, announced a Patriots for Parity Campaign to draw public attention to gaps in the
enforcement of the Parity Act. Representative James Ramstad & Representative Patrick Kennedy,
Remarks at the National Press Club Luncheon (Mar. 14, 2012), available at press.org/newsmultimedia/videos/npc-luncheon-patrick-kennedy-jim-ramstad. Congressionally sponsored field
hearings have been announced for six cities. See Parity Field Hearings, PARITY IMPLEMENTATION
COALITION, parityispersonal.org/Parity_Field_Hearings (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). Testimony at
the June 2012 field hearing in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area highlighted the continuing
inequity in coverage for mental health and substance use disorders and the need for federal
regulators to promulgate a final rule. Id.
15
Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75
Fed. Reg. 5410 (Feb. 2, 2010) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 146, and 26 C.F.R. pt.
54).
16
Id. at 5416-17. (“These regulations do not address the scope of services issue. The
Departments invite comments on whether and to what extent [the Parity Act] addresses the scope of
services or continuum of care provided by a group health plan or health insurance coverage.”).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/3

6

Weber: Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage

2013]

Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage

185

health and substance use disorder care through large employer or
Medicaid managed care plans 17 will receive care that conforms to
clinical care standards or will continue to receive less comprehensive
care than individuals receive for other medical conditions.
These standards are equally important for millions of uninsured or
underinsured individuals who will enroll in private or public insurance
under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 18 The ACA will bring about the
largest expansion of substance use disorder care in our Nation’s
history. 19 It requires all individual and small group plans to include
mental health and substance use disorder services as an essential health
benefit, 20 and those services must be provided at parity with medical
services. The rules that govern the scope of and dictate access to those

17

The Parity Act applies to Medicaid services that are delivered through a managed care
organization or a Pre-Paid Inpatient Health Plan as well as the Children’s Health Insurance Program.
Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Center for Medicaid and State Operations, to State Health Officers,
SHO 09-014 CHIPRA #9 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archiveddownloads/SMDL/downloads/SHO110409.pdf. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
currently deliver Medicaid through managed care organizations to some or all enrollees, but these
states often carve out mental health and/or substance use treatment and reimburse on a fee-forservice basis. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, A PROFILE OF MEDICAID
MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS IN 2010: FINDINGS FROM A 50-STATE SURVEY 2, 3 (2011), available at
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8220-ES.pdf. Non-managed care carve-out arrangements are not
subject to parity requirements. See Letter from Mann, supra.
The Department of Health and Human Services has estimated that, with mandatory issue of health
insurance, an additional 4.8 million individuals in the individual market alone will gain coverage for
substance use disorders, and an additional 2.3 million individuals will gain coverage for mental
health services. ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: INDIVIDUAL MARKET COVERAGE, ASPE ISSUE
BRIEF (Dec. 16, 2011), available at aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/IndividualMarket/ib.pdf
(stating that increased coverage is based on estimates that thirty-four percent of individuals and
families that purchase their own insurance do not have coverage for substance use disorder services,
and eighteen percent do not have coverage for mental health services). In addition, the expansion of
Medicaid under the ACA to cover individuals up to 133% of poverty will extend these protections to
many more individuals. The benchmark or benchmark-equivalent plan that must be offered to these
Medicaid recipients must provide the essential health benefits package including mental health and
substance use disorder services. The ACA extends the parity standards to the treatment limitations
and financial requirements of these benchmark plans. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(c), 124 Stat. 119,
271 (2010).
19
Richard Frank, Ph.D., Remarks at the Closing Addiction Treatment Gap Winter Learning
Session (Feb. 24, 2011) (notes on file with author); see also Jeffrey A. Buck, The Looming
Expansion and Transformation of Public Substance Abuse Treatment Under the Affordable Care
Act, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1402, 1403 (2011) (observing that the unique service system for substance use
disorder treatment will change as a result of healthcare reform, and “[t]he degree of this change may
be as great as, or greater than, that for any other area of health care”).
20
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1), 124 Stat.
119, 163 (2010).
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services determine whether “behavioral health care” 21 will become
synonymous with “health care” or will remain a separate, non-integrated
care system.
This Article asserts that Congress’s goal in enacting the Parity Act
was to align insurance standards with scientific advances and clinical
practice in the treatment of behavioral health conditions and
simultaneously align insurance coverage for mental health and substance
use disorders to the coverage for other medical services. Enforcement
efforts should be guided by how well they will achieve these ends. This
Article demonstrates how the Parity Act, in conjunction with the ACA,
places our nation’s health care system on a path to achieving a more
unified vision of behavioral and physical health care.
Part I of this Article explores the political, social, and economic
forces leading to the enactment of comprehensive parity legislation in
2008. It describes the insurance regulation of mental health and
substance use disorders services through managed behavioral health care
organizations and the impact of that regulation on both an individual
patient and systems scale. Excessive management of behavioral health
benefits, 22 among other factors, led to the enactment of the Parity Act,
and identifying the scope of discrimination helps inform the measures
that are needed to ensure equity. Part II describes the key statutory and
regulatory standards in the Parity Act that were enacted to address
burdensome and discriminatory limitations on care. Part III analyzes the
two key parity standards that remain open to interpretation—the “scope
of services” standard and “comparability” of medical management
standard—and offers interpretive guidance to facilitate enforcement.
Part IV offers recommendations to ensure better enforcement of the
Parity Act through the promulgation of a final federal rule, mandatory
demonstration of parity compliance, state review of plan compliance for
parity, and health plan accreditation standards. These recommendations
respond to three structural features of the Parity Act—complexity of
standards, control of information, and capacity of consumers to
21

The terms “behavioral health” and “mental health and substance use disorders” are used
interchangeably in this Article. The terms “medical benefits” and “medical services” are used
interchangeably and refer to “medical/surgical benefits” as used in the Parity Act.
22
Consumer backlash against managed care cost-containment practices have led to some
modifications in industry practices in the medical context. See Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process,
Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 93,
98 (2006) (explaining that consumer dismay translated into the adoption of preferred-provider
models to allow reimbursement for out-of-network providers with less of a penalty and limitations
on financial incentives to doctors who recommend fewer high-cost treatments). As limited as these
actions have been in addressing “the most serious process and equity questions” in accessing
medical benefits, id., they arguably did not even apply to managed behavioral health care
organizations that separately manage mental health and addiction disorders. See infra Part I.A.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/3

8

Weber: Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage

2013]

Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage

187

enforce—that render current enforcement efforts difficult. These
remedial steps are also essential to ensure that health plans offered under
the ACA are parity-compliant. The Article concludes with observations
about the synergistic effect of health care reform and the Parity Act to
incentivize coverage and delivery of comprehensive addiction and
mental health benefits.
I.

INSURANCE INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND RESTRICTIONS ON CARE:
FACTORS LEADING TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE PARITY ACT

The sponsors of the Parity Act heralded the law as a civil rights
statute that sets equality standards for the delivery of mental health and
substance use disorder services. 23 The Parity Act repudiated insurance
practices that have allowed disparate cost-sharing and limitations on the
duration and setting of care for mental health and substance use disorders
services. Congress stepped in after federal disability discrimination laws
were interpreted to offer no remedy for disparate insurance standards,
and evidence demonstrated that more restrictive coverage denied
appropriate care and was not justified as a cost-control measure.
To fully understand the reach of the parity law and regulation, and
the theoretical framework for addressing the key unresolved regulatory
issues, it is important to identify the health insurance practices that gave
rise to the law. The following section examines the failure of federal
disability rights statutes to address unequal insurance coverage for the
treatment of mental health and substance use disorders, and it describes
the unique insurance practices that have regulated the availability and
scope of these services in the private market since the 1980s. The
section ends with a description of several key compromises that
Congress made to rectify this historical inequity, albeit incompletely.

23

153 CONG. REC. H15,449, 15,450 (2007) (statement of Rep. Patrick Kennedy)
(“[I]nsurance companies don’t treat [addiction and mental illness] the same for insurance
purposes . . . . We want to see the discrimination against mental illnesses end . . . .”); id. at 15,450
(statement of Rep. James Ramstad) (“[I]t’s time to end the discrimination against people suffering
the ravages of mental illness and chemical addiction. It’s time to end the higher copayments, higher
deductibles, the out-of-pocket costs and limited treatment stays. . . . It’s time to treat mental illness
and chemical addiction under the same rules as physical illnesses.”).
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A.

PRE-PARITY ACT INSURANCE REGULATION OF MENTAL HEALTH
AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER CARE

1.

Health Insurance Discrimination and Remedies Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act

Health insurance, by its very nature, discriminates in coverage, 24
drawing distinctions based on age, sex, medical history, and health
status, as well as on which medical treatments, procedures, and
prescription drugs are reimbursable. 25 Insurance carriers profit from
attracting younger and healthier populations, and they design policies to
achieve this end. 26 The principle of actuarial fairness, which governs
considerations of unfair discrimination in insurance, 27 is based on the
premise that each individual should bear financial responsibility for his
or her own risk of incurring medical expenses. Coverage and pricing
decisions are designed to ensure that persons presenting comparable
medical risk are segmented into homogeneous pools so that a person

24

See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 115 (2008) (noting that
state insurance laws draw distinctions based on actuarial data that demonstrates “actual differences
in the likelihood that each customer will file a claim during the policy period”); Mary Crossley,
Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 81-83, 85-91
(2005).
25
A range of civil rights laws limit, to varying degrees, distinctions based on sex, disability,
and age in employer-based health insurance coverage and pricing. See Crossley, supra note 24, at
85-99. Fewer protections exist when health insurance is purchased outside the employment context.
But, as Professor Crossley observes, the non-discrimination standards that apply even to employerbased health insurance under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age
Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) vary dramatically based on the protected class. Id.
Protections against disability and age discrimination reach only disparate treatment, while genderbased protections extend to disparate-impact discrimination. Id. at 91, 93, 95-96 (noting that the
ADEA actually allows employers to give “lesser benefits” to older employees as compared to those
given to younger employees). Actuarial fairness standards also limit protections for disability and
age-based discrimination but do not apply to gender classifications. Id. at 107-08. See also Sharona
Hoffman, AIDS Caps, Contraceptive Coverage, and the Law: An Analysis of the Fed. AntiDiscrimination Statutes’ Applicability to Health Insurance, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2002).
26
Crossley, supra note 24, at 82. The ACA, when fully implemented in 2014, will end many
of the most exclusionary practices in the individual and small group markets by eliminating
underwriting practices that base coverage and pricing on an individual’s health status, Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 2701, 124 Stat. 119, 155 (2010), and by prohibiting denials of care based on a person’s
pre-existing health condition. Id. § 2704. In setting premiums, qualified health plans will be limited
to considerations of age, type of coverage (family or individual), geographic rating area, and
smoking status. Id. § 2701.
27
Crossley, supra note 24, at 109-10 (describing state laws barring unfair trade practices in
health insurance, which are based on the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ model
act, which bans health insurers from “unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class
and of essentially the same hazard”).
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with a “healthier” profile is not required to subsidize the costs of care for
a person with riskier health characteristics. 28
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, when the ADA was enacted in 1990,
it prohibited insurance discrimination against individuals with
disabilities 29 but incorporated the principle of actuarial fairness into its
non-discrimination standard. The insurance provision, which became
known as the “safe-harbor” provision, 30 offered limited protection
against insurance discrimination. By its terms, the ADA permits health
insurance plans to create disability-based distinctions and apply
underwriting and risk classifications that adversely affect persons with
disabilities as long as the plan is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of the ADA. 31 Guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) in the early 1990s stated that a plan could satisfy
the “no subterfuge” standard by demonstrating that any disability-related
distinctions are justified by the risks or costs associated with that
disability. 32 Legitimate actuarial data using risk calculations that are not
outdated, inaccurate, or based on false stereotypes related to disability
would be sufficient proof, as would evidence that the disability
classification is necessary to prevent plan insolvency or unacceptable
changes in coverage or premiums that will subject the plan to adverse
selection. 33 The legislative history on the insurance provision affirms the
centrality of the actuarial fairness standard, explaining that “a person
with a disability cannot be denied insurance or be subjected to different
terms or conditions of insurance based on disability alone.” 34
28

Id. at 77-79 (setting out Professor Deborah Stone’s competing concepts of actuarial
fairness and solidarity in insurance coverage and pricing); Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the
Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287 (1993).
29
Titles I, II, and III of the ADA prohibit employers, public entity-sponsored health plans,
and insurance companies, respectively, from discriminating against individuals with disabilities in
health insurance. See Title I, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. (Westlaw 2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(a)(vi)
(Westlaw 2012); Title II, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131 et seq. (Westlaw 2012); 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(a)
(Westlaw 2013); Title III, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181 et seq. (Westlaw 2012); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.104, 36.202
(Westlaw 2013).
30
See Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the
ADA’s insurance provision “is obviously intended for the benefit of insurance companies rather than
plaintiffs”).
31
42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c) (Westlaw 2013).
32
EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.002, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN
EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE (1993), available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
health.html (identifying a framework for evaluating whether an employer-provided health insurance
plan violates the ADA, which looks first to whether the challenged term is a disability-based
distinction and, second, to whether the disability-based distinction falls within the protection of the
ADA’s safe-harbor provision).
33
Id.; see infra note 49 (explaining “adverse selection”).
34
S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 84 (1989) (emphasis added).
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ADA protections have been further weakened by appellate courts’
construction of the “insurance safe harbor” provision, requiring evidence
of specific intent to discriminate rather than the mere absence of actuarial
Judicial
or other objective data to support the distinctions. 35
interpretations of the ADA’s insurance provision have generally allowed
insurance plans to deny and place caps on care for a range of health
conditions so long as all policyholders receive the same package of
health benefits. 36
Most important for purposes of the Parity Act, the ADA has been
consistently interpreted to permit health plans to offer more limited
benefit coverage for mental health and substance use disorders than for
physical conditions. Two grounds for allowing this inferior coverage in
health insurance have been articulated. First, according to the EEOC,
“nervous/mental” conditions do not meet the threshold ADA requirement
of being a “disability-based” distinction because they apply to a
“multitude of dissimilar conditions and . . . constrain individuals both
with and without disabilities.” 37 Second, because these benefits apply

35

See, e.g., Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 104-06 (2d Cir. 1999);
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998) (refusing to require insurance
companies to justify their insurance coverage; subterfuge analysis would elevate courts to position of
“super-actuary” and “watchdog” of insurance business); John V. Jacobi, Parity and Difference: The
Value of Parity Legislation for the Seriously Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 188-89 (2003)
(stating that narrow interpretations of the ADA safe harbor provision will result in no protection
against discriminatory treatment in insurance coverage of persons with mental illness).
36
See, e.g., Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing to
strike limits on medical coverage for AIDS as Title III does not require insurance product to be
“equally valuable to the disabled and the nondisabled”); Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Inc., 149 F.3d
453, 457-58 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a health insurance plan that covered some but not all organ
transplants did not violate Title I, II, or III, because the same policy was provided to all employees,
and the ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with different disabilities); Modderno
v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (opining that a monetary cap
on hospitalization for mental illness was not a violation of the Rehabilitation Act because same
insurance coverage was made available to all regardless of handicap; “[e]qual coverage for all is
non-discriminatory”).
37
EEOC, supra note 32; see also Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1061 (holding that a lifetime cap on
mental health benefits that did not distinguish between disabling and non-disabling mental illness
did not meet disability-based criteria). Clearly, health insurance plans cover “health conditions,” and
an individual who seeks to challenge a restrictive mental health or substance use disorder benefit
under the ADA would have to establish a “substantial limitation on a major life activity,” to meet the
ADA coverage standard. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102 (Westlaw 2012). At the same time, the EEOC’s
pronouncement that “nervous/mental” conditions are not a disability-based classification seems
inconsistent with the types of classifications it found would be covered, i.e., an insurance term or
provision that “singles out a particular disability . . . , a discrete group of disabilities (e.g., cancers,
muscular dystrophies, kidney diseases), or disability in general.” EEOC, supra note 32. Mental
illness and addiction are certainly a discrete group of disabilities for those individuals who can meet
the definition of disability, and these conditions are no different than the referenced health
conditions that would also encompass persons with and without disabilities. Under the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, a plaintiff could satisfy the definition of “disability” fairly easily, as
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“equally” to all plan participants, courts conclude that the plans are not
engaged in intentional discrimination on the basis of disability—the
requisite standard for finding insurance discrimination under the ADA. 38
Although a more restrictive mental health benefit will have a greater
impact on individuals with a mental health disability as compared to the
general public or those with physical disabilities, a claim alleging a
disparate impact in health benefits is not generally actionable under the
ADA. 39 Courts that have considered the validity of more restrictive
mental health coverage for persons in disability insurance policies—
those in which disability is explicitly the basis for coverage—have
generally upheld differential standards for mental illness as long as
persons with mental disabilities are not provided different benefit
coverage than persons without disabilities. 40 Recently, some courts have
applied a more expansive definition of disability discrimination based on
the Supreme Court’s decision in L.C. v. Olmstead, 41 which recognizes
that discrimination between classes of disabled persons is actionable.
This has allowed courts to reach the merits of disability insurance
policies (as opposed to health insurance plans) that offer more restrictive

mental health and substance use disorders are impairments that substantially limit the brain and
neurological system. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(B), (4)(E)(i) (Westlaw 2012). However, meeting this
threshold would not necessarily result in success on an insurance discrimination claim, given the
required proof of disparate treatment as opposed to disparate impact.
38
EEOC, supra note 32 (relying on Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), for the
proposition that disparate-impact discrimination is not a basis for insurance benefit design
challenges); see also Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1065 (finding that a lifetime maximum of $75,000 for
mental health benefits under federal benefit plan did not violate Section 504, because the plan did
not use a disability-based criterion in setting the limitation, and, while the standard would have an
unequal impact on persons with mental illness as compared to those with physical disabilities,
Section 504 did not reach disparate-impact claims under Alexander v. Choate); Doe v. Colautti, 592
F.2d 704,708-09 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a limit on the number of days covered by state
Medicaid in private psychiatric hospital as compared to unlimited duration of care in general private
hospital did not violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, because the Act only requires
coverage for persons with mental illness that is equal to that provided to persons without disabilities
and does not require provision of specialized services for persons with disabilities).
39
Although the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate did not, in fact, rule out disparateimpact claims in the context of health insurance, its ruling would require that the disparity between
persons with and without disabilities be so substantial as to effectively deny persons with disabilities
meaningful access to coverage. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301, 303 (“Section 504 does not require the
State to alter . . . the benefit being offered simply to meet the reality that the handicapped have
greater medical needs.”); see Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1066 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining the
ruling in Alexander). Access to some coverage, albeit inferior, would not satisfy this standard.
40
See EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2000); Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2000); Kimber v. Thiokol
Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir.
1999); Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 434 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v.
Shering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d
1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
41
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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mental disability coverage than physical disability coverage. 42 These
cases suggest that the ADA would invalidate disparate disability
insurance coverage for mental health/substance use disorders if the plan
was motivated by stereotypes about mental disability rather than by
actuarial considerations. 43
This more expansive concept of discrimination, while never applied
in health insurance cases brought under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act,
is the foundation of the Parity Act’s non-discrimination standards.
Congress started with the principle that disparate insurance standards
between mental health/substance use disorders and physical conditions
are deemed to be discriminatory, unless clinical justifications, not
actuarial reasons, support a different standard.
What led Congress to regulate health insurance standards for
persons with mental health and substance use disorders and provide
unique discrimination protections that are not available to persons under
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act? 44 To answer this question, the
following two sections briefly describe the evolution of the managed
behavioral health care system for mental health and substance use
disorders and the impact of that system on service delivery and access to
insurance-reimbursed services. In brief, a pattern of “wrongful”
discrimination 45 had emerged that compelled Congress to enact the
42

See Fletcher v. Tufts Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 110-11 (D. Mass. 2005) (denying motion
to dismiss ADA claims because the disparate treatment of persons with mental and physical illness
in long-term disability insurance plan may reflect a view of persons with mental illness that is based
on stereotype rather than assessment of severity of condition); Iwata v. Intel Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d
135, 155 (D. Mass. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss ADA claim of unlawful differential treatment
under employer’s long-term disability coverage for mental illness, because the widespread practice
of limiting disability benefits may be “based on assumptions that mental illness is ‘less real’ than
physical disability, or that recovery therefrom is more a matter of will than in the case of physical
disability” and in light of the absence of actuarial data to support the disparate standard). A panel of
the Eleventh Circuit articulated this same notion of discrimination when evaluating disparate mental
illness coverage under a disability insurance policy. See Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035,
1054 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated for reh’g en banc, 281 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
(abstaining from rendering a decision pending bankruptcy proceedings). The EEOC endorsed this
broader interpretation of disability-based discrimination in an amicus curiae brief filed in Johnson.
Id. at 1051.
43
Fletcher, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (“If the LTD Plan’s distinction between classes of
persons with disabilities is based on such stereotypes or is otherwise arbitrary, Title I, considered in
the light of Olmstead, would condemn the Plan as applied to Fletcher.”); Iwata, 349 F. Supp. 2d at
155.
44
See Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1062 (finding that the Rehabilitation Act does not afford such
special protection).
45
DEBORAH HELLMAN, supra note 24, at 13. Professor Hellman has explored the question
of when it is permissible for public and private entities to draw distinctions among people and when
such line drawing constitutes “wrongful” discrimination. Distinctions drawn by an insurer may
cross the line into “wrongful” discrimination if, according to Hellman, the insurer’s policy expresses
denigration of or demeans a group of individuals based on “our common history and culture and its
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Parity Act. At the same time, Congress’s rejection of the prevailing
discriminatory insurance standards was incomplete, as the bill’s sponsors
had to balance powerful insurance industry and consumer interests to
achieve passage. Specific legislative compromises, described in subpart
B of this Part, facilitated the enactment of significant, yet imperfect, nondiscrimination protections.
Those “compromise provisions” have
contributed to uncertainty in interpretation that ultimately undermines
current enforcement efforts.
2.

Controlling the Cost of Mental Health and Addiction Treatment

Insurance carriers point to both actuarial data and unique features in
mental health and substance use disorder care to justify separate and
distinct insurance standards. First, evidence related to “moral hazard” 46
suggests that consumer demand for mental health care is more elastic
based on price than the corresponding demand for care for other
conditions. In studies conducted during the 1970s and 1980s, the
reported consumer response to reduced cost-sharing in mental health care
was nearly twice as large as the response in medical services. 47 This data
justified insurers’ choice to “regulate” consumer utilization by imposing

conventions and social understandings.” Id. at 35. Discriminatory insurance standards for persons
with mental health and substance use disorders continue to express the view that individuals with
alcohol and drug addiction and mental illness are less worthy of equal treatment than other
individuals, consistent with our history of segregating and institutionalizing persons with these
disorders. See RICHARD G. FRANK & SHERRY A. GLIED, BETTER BUT NOT WELL: MENTAL HEALTH
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1950, at 1-2 (2006); see generally DAVID MUSTO, THE
AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL, at 273-93 (3d ed. 1999).
46
“Moral hazard” refers to the increase in use and costs that result from the provision of
insurance coverage and applies to all forms of health and other insurance. Richard G. Frank et al.,
Will Parity in Coverage Result in Better Mental Health Care?, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1701, 1701
(2001); see also Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 13-15, 45 (1999) (describing “moral hazard” as the economics, as opposed to
political science, paradigm for analyzing insurance). Professor Stone objects to the conventional
construction of “moral hazard,” which ascribes “immoral” motives to persons who seek insurance
and justifies limitations on the conditions and level of coverage and the kinds of persons and risks
that will be insured. Id. at 13-15. She posits a paradigm of insurance as a “major way that
communities can make life better for their individual members” and collective well-being. Id. at 15.
47
Frank et al., supra note 10, at 110. The most widely cited study for the moral hazard
problem in mental health care is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, conducted in the mid1970s, which found that ambulatory medical expenses double when going from no insurance to full
insurance, while ambulatory mental health expenditures quadruple. Id. at 110; see also Vanessa
Azzone et al., Effect of Insurance Parity on Substance Abuse Treatment, 62 HEALTH AFF. 129, 13233 (2011) (suggesting that substance use treatment is less price-sensitive than mental health
treatment); Colleen L. Barry et al., The Costs of Mental Health Parity: Still an Impediment?, 25
HEALTH AFF. 623, 625-29 (2006) (outlining five studies evaluating demand-response for mental
health treatment).
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higher costs on consumers of certain mental health services. 48 Insurers
also cite adverse selection risk 49 that results when plans offer more
generous mental health benefits and, consequently, attract persons with
chronic mental health problems who anticipate the need for substantial
care. Such plans must reimburse for higher expenditures, face the
prospect of increasing premiums to support higher costs, and potentially
experience the loss of healthier plan members who seek less costly
insurance. 50 To preserve profitability, plans limit their mental health
benefits to avoid the risks posed by persons with mental health illness. 51
At the behest of employers, insurance carriers and self-insured
group health plans responded to both the moral hazard and adverseselection problems, and the growth in mental health spending in the
1980s, 52 by adopting design features to tightly control access to and
utilization of mental health services. Plans imposed tight limitations on
the number of outpatient visits or days of inpatient care that would be
authorized and reimbursed, and they increased cost-sharing requirements
to control consumer demand. 53 Many insurance carriers also adopted
managed care standards, such as utilization review and prior or
concurrent authorization protocols, to control service supply. In addition
to these traditional tools, insurers began to “carve out” the delivery of
addiction and mental health services from medical services and turn the
48

Barry et al., supra note 47, at 627.
See Frank et al., supra note 10, at 111. (“Adverse selection occurs when potential
enrollees differ in their risks, know more about their health risks than do health plans, and enroll in
health plans that are paid premiums that do not fully reflect those differences in risks.”).
50
Id. (describing an Aetna plan offered in the FEHB program in the 1970s that provided a
mental health parity benefit not offered by Blue Cross; Aetna attracted a “needier” population of
enrollees, lost money, and rescinded its benefit); see also Doe v. Devine, 703 F.2d 1319, 1325, 1331
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (allowing reduction in mental health benefits in FEHBP plan offered by Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, noting purpose of benefit reduction was to avoid adverse selection).
51
Frank et al., supra note 10, at 111.
52
FRANK & GLIED, supra note 45, at 87-88. Estimates of spending on substance use disorder
services are often combined with those for mental health services, because of the high rate of cooccurring disorders among patients and the practice of coding a service as a mental health service
rather than substance use disorder, to ensure reimbursement. KATHARINE R. LEVIT ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROJECTIONS OF NATIONAL EXPENDITURES FOR MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 2004-2014, at 13, 28 (2008), available at
www.samhsa.gov/Financing/file.axd?file=2009%2F6%2FProjections+of+National+Expenditures+fo
r+Mental+Health+Services+and+Substance+Abuse+Treatment%2C+2004-2014.pdf. Nonetheless,
spending for substance use disorder services has historically accounted for a very small portion of
total mental health spending. In 1986, 22% of total mental health spending was for substance use
disorder services, and by 2003 it had dropped to 17%. Id. at 28.
53
Barry et al., supra note 47, at 627. By 1995, 89% of private insurance plans had inpatient
limits on mental health benefits and 96% had limits on outpatient care. Id. According to Barry and
her colleagues, day limitations, when coupled with sizable cost-sharing, are intended to risk-select,
rather than protect against higher than average utilization, because a day limit offers only modest
savings when cost-sharing is imposed. Id.
49
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management of those benefits over to separate managed behavioral
health organizations (MBHOs). 54 MBHOs developed tight networks of
participating providers that agreed to reduced rates in exchange for a
higher volume of patients directed to the network providers, 55 and they
limited access to care outside of those networks. MBHOs also adopted
algorithms related to standard length of treatment 56 and adopted strict
medical management protocols for the preauthorization of hospital and
office visits. 57
Each of these strategies had the goal of controlling costs. 58
Professors Richard Frank and Sherry Glied, 59 who have chronicled the
history of mental health care in the United States, observed that MBHO
practices have restricted choice, but suggested, based on data up to the
year 2000, that these restrictions were offset by substantial savings for
consumers. As of 2000, consumers paid less for many key mental health
services than they had paid in the late 1980s. 60
54

FRANK & GLIED, supra note 45, at 88 (large-scale introduction of managed behavioral
health care carve-out industry began in 1987, and MBHOs dominated the field by 1994).
55
Id. According to Frank and Glied, MBHOs recognized that a range of professionals,
including master-level social workers and psychologists, could provide certain mental health care as
effectively as psychiatrists and Ph.D. psychologists, and MBHOs could reduce the cost of care while
making it more available to the public by directing patients to those network providers. As a result,
earnings for psychiatrists and psychologists declined during the 1990s while the earnings of social
workers remained constant, and overall earnings of master-level professionals converged at the level
of social workers. Id. at 87-88.
56
Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75
Fed. Reg. 5410, 5422 (Feb. 2, 2010) (referring to MBHOs as “vendors” that are known as
“behavioral health carve-outs” that use various tools to control spending for mental health and
substance use treatment); see also Letter from Justine Handelman, Exec. Dir. Blue Cross Blue Shield
Ass’n, to Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Health & Human Servs.
Sec’y, and Hilda Solis, U.S. Labor Sec’y 9 (May 3, 2010), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210AB30-5371.pdf (comments on the Interim Final Rules implementing the Parity Act) (noting the
behavioral health literature indicates that the average number of visits to a non-physician provider
for treatment of a mental health/substance use disorder is approximately six visits; if a patient has
substantially more visits, “there may be a need to manage the benefit”).
57
FRANK & GLIED, supra note 45, at 88. Implementing prior authorizations for psychiatric
admissions rapidly reduced hospital admission rates, caused a real decline in occupancy rates, and
consequently gave MHBOs increased bargaining power over cost with hospitals that were eager to
maintain occupancy. Id.
58
Carter & Landau, supra note 1, at 46-47 (“[Behavioral health management
(BHM)]companies are generally considered to be conservative with their determinations of medical
necessity, especially for hospitalization. Providers have generally accepted these strict BHM
determinations consistent with a long history of employer plans providing a second-class level of
benefits for mental health services.”).
59
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at the Department of
Health and Human Services from 2009-2011, Professor Frank was directly involved in the
development of the Parity Act regulations. Professor Glied has served as the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation at the Department from July 2010 and is involved in the enforcement of the
law.
60
FRANK & GLIED, supra note 45, at 90.
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MBHOs, insurance carriers, and business associations defend these
arrangements as necessary to ensure quality care and good patient
management in the most appropriate setting. 61 According to insurers,
extensive and different oversight is needed because diagnosis and
treatment protocols for mental health and substance use disorders are less
“objective” 62 and allow for greater practitioner discretion 63 than
standards for medical services, which often follow standardized
treatment protocols. 64 An insurer knows, for example, when a broken
leg is mended, because an x-ray provides visual evidence of healing, but
bright-line indicators for the termination of mental health and substance
abuse treatment do not exist. 65 Close monitoring in the form of prior
authorization and frequent concurrent review permits an insurer to
identify patients who are not improving, require different interventions, 66
or no longer meet medical necessity criteria. 67 Insurers also point to the
61

These explanations are taken, in part, from comments submitted by these same entities on
the parity Interim Final Rule, which subjects medical management tools to scrutiny. Insurers and
business associations opposed the potential disruption of these practices, which they acknowledged
are not comparable to management practices for general medical/surgical care. See, e.g., Letter from
Paul M. Rosenberg, General Counsel, ValueOptions, Inc., to Office of Health Plan Standards &
Compliance Assistance Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and
Internal Revenue Serv. 6-7 (May 3, 2010), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB30-5373.pdf
(comments on the Interim Final Rules implementing the Parity Act); Letter from Kathryn Wilber,
Am. Benefits Council, Neil Trautwein, National Retail Fed’n, and Randel K. Johnson, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, to U.S. Dep’t of Labor 5-6 (May 28, 2009), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210AB30-5365.pdf (comments on the Parity Act Interim Final Regulations).
62
See Letter from Anthony M. Kotin, Chief Medical Officer, Magellan Health Servs., to the
Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and U.S. Dep’t of Treasury 24 (May
3, 2010), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB30-5358.pdf (comments on the Interim Final
Rules implementing the Parity Act) (observing that patients may stay in treatment unnecessarily
because of “loneliness, personal development issues and other reasons unrelated to medical
necessity”); SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL
NECESSITY IN PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CARE 14 (2003),
available at store.samhsa.gov/shin/content/SMA03-3790/SMA03-3790.pdf.
63
Letter from Paul M. Rosenberg, supra note 61, at 7.
64
Letter from Justine Handelman, supra note 56, at 10.
65
Letter from Madeleine Steckel, Assoc. Regulatory Counsel, Magellan Health Servs., to
U.S. Dep’t of Labor 7 (May 28, 2009) (request for information regarding the Parity Act). Cenpatico,
another MBHO, identified similar differences even with the care of chronic medical conditions, such
as diabetes, as opposed to acute conditions. It noted that medical management of diabetes involves
laboratory work and office visits as compared to extensive psychotherapy for mental health
conditions like depression. Letter from Sam Donaldson, President & CEO, Cenpatico 3 (May 3,
2010), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB30-5324.pdf (comments on the Interim Final
Rules implementing the Parity Act).
66
See Letter from Justine Handelman supra note 56, at 8-9.
67
One MBHO noted that patients seek to continue behavioral health care long after treatment
has returned them to normal levels of functioning, defining this as elective care that is not common
for medical/surgical care. Letter from Patricia L. Friedley, Exec. Vice President, Behavioral Health
Sys., to Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 2 (May 3, 2009), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210AB30-5337.pdf (comments on the Interim Final Rules implementing the Parity Act). This same
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diversity of the behavioral health workforce—a feature MHBOs
capitalized on to lower costs—as another feature warranting special
oversight. Medical care is typically delivered by licensed providers and
in licensed medical facilities, while behavioral health care is provided by
a broader range of practitioners—psychiatrists, psychologists, licensed
social workers, certified addiction counselors, and lay peer support—
who have varying degrees of education, training, and licensure, as well
as different approaches to care and recovery. 68 One leading MHBO has
asserted that its clients rely on it to conduct specialized credentialing to
assure high quality care. 69
Parsing the merits of the insurance industry’s assertions is less
important (for now) 70 than understanding the significant impact these
distinctive practices have had on the financing of and access to privately
insured mental health and substance use care over the past twenty years.
Although Professors Frank and Glied found that, in the early period of
MHBO activity “reductions in spending and costs [did] not come at the
expense of the quality of care,” 71 their review of mental health treatment
data from 1996 to 2006 identified several disturbing trends. 72 Evidence
of human suffering and increased health and social costs related to
untreated addiction and mental health motivated Congress to take
corrective action.
3.

Impact of Managed Behavioral Health Care on Health Services
Delivery

The effect of MBHO medical management practices on behavioral
health care services is readily apparent from the decline in funding for
substance use disorder treatment. In 1986, private insurance accounted
for 30% of funding for substance use disorder treatment. 73 By 2003,
private insurance paid for only 10% of substance use treatment, 74 and

MBHO imposed health benefit conditions on patients in substance use disorder treatment to reduce
“recidivism.” Id. at 3.
68
ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 62, at 14-15.
69
Letter from Anthony M. Kotin, supra note 62, at 28.
70
See discussion infra accompanying notes 294-298.
71
FRANK & GLIED, supra note 45, at 89.
72
Sherry A. Glied & Richard G. Frank, Better but Not Best: Recent Trends in the Well-Being
of the Mentally Ill, 28 HEALTH AFF. 637, 646 (2009).
73
LEVIT ET AL., supra note 52, at 32.
74
Id. Researchers attributed this “almost nonexistent” growth in private insurance spending
for substance use disorder treatment to the “evolution of managed care and the cost-containment
efforts of businesses.” Id. at iv. They likewise projected slow acceleration in the future. Id.
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public financing constituted more than three fourths of all spending. 75
This funding imbalance is in sharp contrast with spending for all other
health care, where public sources pay for less than half of the care. 76
This funding pattern, 77 according to researchers, is directly related to
barriers in insurance coverage for substance use treatment that do not
exist for medical services. 78 Specialty substance abuse treatment centers,
largely publicly funded, now rank the highest among service providers
based on spending. 79 This abdication by private health insurers
contributes to an alarmingly large number of persons who receive no
treatment for their substance use conditions. Only 11% (2.3 million
individuals) of the nearly 21.6 million individuals who needed treatment
for an alcohol or drug use disorder in 2011 received care at a specialty
treatment facility. 80
A slightly different picture emerges for mental health spending, but
one nonetheless shaped by managed behavioral health care. Private
insurance funding for mental health care increased slightly from 1986 to
2003—from 21% to 24% 81 —primarily as a result of the significant
increase in the use of prescription medications for mental health
disorders 82 and increased access to care through primary care physicians
who have gained comfort in prescribing these medications. 83 MBHO
75

Id.; Katharine R. Levit et al., Future Funding for Mental Health and Substance Abuse:
Increasing Burdens for the Public Sector, 27 HEALTH AFF. w513 (2008).
76
Id. at w516; Buck, supra note 19, at 1403.
77
Projections of financing for substance use disorder treatment made prior to the enactment
of the Parity Act estimated that by 2014 private insurance coverage would drop to 7% of all costs,
and public insurance would increase to cover 83% of costs. Levit et al., supra note 75, at w520.
78
Id. at w520-w521 (differential standards include annual and lifetime limits for inpatient
hospitalization and outpatient visits and higher cost-sharing through deductibles and coinsurance).
79
Id. at w519, w520-w521 (41% of services in 2003, up from 19% in 1986).
80
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2011
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 84 (2012).
Specialty treatment is defined as treatment received at a hospital (inpatient only), drug or alcohol
rehabilitation facility (inpatient or outpatient), or mental health center. Id. at 83. An additional 1.2
million individuals received care for their substance use conditions at private doctors’ offices or
emergency rooms. Id. at 81. Among the roughly one million individuals who perceived a need for
treatment but did not receive care, one-third (32.3%) reported that they had no health coverage and
could not afford the cost. Id. at 86.
81
Levit et al., supra note 75, at w517 (exhibit 3).
82
Richard G. Frank et al., Trends in Mental Health Cost Growth: An Expanded Role for
Management, 28 HEALTH AFF. 649, 657 (2009) (spending on medications increased from 7% in
1986 to 23% in 2003, a trend directly related to the costs of prescription drugs being handled outside
the typical MBHO carve-out plan).
83
Levit et al., supra note 75, at w518. Since cost-sharing is generally lower for primary care
physician visits than for specialty mental health care, patients have been encouraged to seek care in
their general medical setting. Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5423 (Feb. 2, 2010). The quality of care, however, is not
necessarily as good as that provided in specialty mental health settings. One study that found 12.7%
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control over costly inpatient care is readily observed in the spending
reductions for specialty mental health hospitals and nursing homes. 84
The private sector lost 30,000 psychiatric hospital beds from 1990 to
2002 as a result of managed care utilization review and economic
factors. 85
Professors Frank and Glied have also identified several other trends
in mental health care provided from 2000 to 2006 that reveal the “service
limiting” effect of managed behavioral health care. First, the expansion
of treatment through primary care practitioners has focused on
populations with less serious mental health-related problems. 86 Second,
the rate of psychiatric hospitalization of adults and children has increased
since 2000, 87 resulting in a shortage of psychiatric beds in over three
fourths of the states, 88 and persons with mental illness have faced
massive incarceration. 89 Frank and Glied explain the increase in
psychiatric hospitalization as either reflecting a lack of community-based
services or a “return to a more balanced mix of treatment modalities” 90
following sharp reductions of admissions under strict utilization review
standards. Other experts link the hospitalization and incarceration trends
to other common managed care practices: short, but repeated,
hospitalization that results from MBHOs applying the narrowest
definition of “medical necessity” to address acute dangerousness or crisis
stabilization, as opposed to longer treatments that could “prevent rapid
readmission, homelessness, and criminalization.” 91

of patients received minimally adequate mental health care in general medical settings compared to
48.3% of patients treated in specialty mental health settings. Id. (citing P.S. Wang et al., Twelve
Month Use of Mental Health Services in the United States, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 629
(2005)).
84
Levit et al., supra note 75, at w517 (spending for specialty mental hospitals dropped from
25% in 1986 to 12% in 2003, and for nursing homes from 14% to 6%). The portion of funding for
general hospital care for mental health services (as opposed to specialty hospitals) did not drop
during this period; 17% of care in 1986 and 16% of care in 2003 was provided in general hospital
psychiatric units. Id. This contrasts with addiction care, in which all hospital-based services
declined. Id. at w520.
85
Steven S. Sharfstein & Faith B. Dickerson, Hospital Psychiatry for the Twenty-First
Century, 28 HEALTH AFF. 685, 686 (2009).
86
Glied & Frank, supra note 72, at 646. Persons with “mental health activity limitations”
reported having less contact with mental health professionals, and senior citizens reported a steeper
decline in professional mental health services. Id. at 640.
87
Id. at 642; Sharfstein & Dickerson, supra note 85, at 686.
88
Sharfstein & Dickerson, supra note 85, at 686.
89
Glied & Frank, supra note 72, at 645-46.
90
Id. at 646.
91
Id.; Sharfstein & Dickerson, supra note 85, at 687.
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The People Behind the Numbers

Stories of real human suffering demonstrate the harsh consequences
of limiting mental health and substance use disorder services. In
congressional field hearings conducted in 2008 on the parity bill,
members of Congress heard stories of young lives cut short because a
son or daughter could not access treatment he or she needed through a
parent’s insurance plan. 92 They learned that families had paid high
insurance premiums expecting to have coverage for mental health or
addiction care only to find that, when care was needed, the plan’s
Provider networks did not include
coverage was “hollow.” 93
professionals who could treat certain mental health conditions, forcing
families to seek care from more expensive out-of-network providers; 94
insurance companies suspended payment for residential addiction
treatment after several days of care 95 and doled out authorizations for
care for only two or three days at a time; 96 and plans did not provide full
coverage for mental health counseling and medication. 97 Ordinary
citizens who testified at the hearings made the case that care for mental
health and addiction disorders was limited or denied 98 in order to “save”
insurance companies money to reimburse for the treatment of other
medical conditions, 99 an inequity that certainly would not be tolerated if
92

REPRESENTATIVES PATRICK J. KENNEDY & JIM RAMSTAD, ENDING INSURANCE
DISCRIMINATION: FAIRNESS AND EQUALITY FOR AMERICANS WITH MENTAL HEALTH AND
ADDICTIVE DISORDERS 13 (May 2, 2007). Indeed, some commentators have attributed the inclusion
of addiction services in the parity bill to the willingness of Representatives Patrick Kennedy and
James Ramstad to publicly disclose their own need for treatment for prescription drug dependence
and alcoholism, respectively. Barry et al., supra note 4, at 415-16. The Senate sponsors of the
original parity bill, the late Senator Paul Wellstone and Senator Pete Domenici, had equally personal
experiences with family members who suffered from mental illness. Id. at 416. Those involved in
the legislative process concluded that “the personal dimension of this policy issue was widely
viewed . . . as having been decisive.” Id. at 417; see also Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End
Insurance Discrimination Against Mental Health Care, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 364 (2004)
(describing his decision to keep his depression private as typical of “millions [who] must hide
debilitating diseases for fear of prejudice, where potentially life-saving healthcare is routinely denied
to a disfavored class”).
93
See KENNEDY & RAMSTAD, supra note 92, at 6.
94
Id. at 15.
95
Id. at 14.
96
Id. at 14-15.
97
Id. at 13.
98
A survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Education
Trust in 2002 found that 74% of workers in employer-sponsored health plans with mental health
benefits were subject to an annual outpatient visit limit, 64% were subject to an inpatient day visit
limit and 22% had higher cost-sharing for mental health benefits than for general medical benefits.
Colleen L. Barry et al., Design of Mental Health Insurance Coverage: Still Unequal After All These
Years, 22 HEALTH AFF. 127, 129 (Sept./Oct. 2003).
99
KENNEDY & RAMSTAD, supra note 92, at 18.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/3

22

Weber: Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage

2013]

Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage

201

savings were to be achieved through reductions in care for persons with
hypertension who, for example, could not maintain a healthy diet or
exercise regimen. 100
This second-class status experienced by fully insured families 101 is
at odds with solid scientific evidence that has largely erased the line
between diseases of the body and mind. 102 Brain-imaging now
documents the differences between a healthy and diseased brain and
reveals the biological and chemical features that are associated with
mental health and addiction disorders. Distinctions in insurance
coverage for diseases of the body, such as Parkinson’s disease, versus
those of the mind, such as alcoholism, no longer hold up when the only
difference between the two is the region of the brain that is affected by
and implicated in the malady. 103
This objective evidence was further bolstered by cost data that
undermined insurance carrier claims of unaffordability and
uncontrollable consumption. 104 Evaluation of the economic impact of

100

See id. at 18. Some families also took their grievances over inequitable coverage to court.
See, e.g., Edgar v. MVP Health Plan, Inc., No. 1:09–cv–700 (GLS\DRH), 2011 WL 1770303
(N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (challenging refusal to reimburse for an out-of-network residential
program); Jon N. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass. Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2010)
(challenging refusal to reimburse for an adolescent’s residential care because level of care not
covered); Hirsh v. Boeing Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 719 F. Supp. 2d 508 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(challenging cap on reimbursement for residential treatment); Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mass. Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D. Mass. 2009) (challenging denial of reimbursement for
residential treatment based on restrictive medical necessity criteria of safety risk); Slover v. Boral
Henderson Clay Prods., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (challenging refusal to reimburse
for the portion of treatment that could be designated as alcoholism or depression services as opposed
to drug addiction treatment); DePina v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 674 F. Supp. 46 (D. Mass. 1987)
(challenging denial of reimbursement for court-ordered alcoholism treatment).
101
See KENNEDY & RAMSTAD, supra note 92, at 6.
102
See A. Thomas McLellan et al., Drug Dependence, a Chronic Medical Illness:
Implications for Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1689,
1691 (2000) (describing pathophysiologic changes in the brain from alcohol and drug use); Brian D.
Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or
Merely Good Intentions, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 65-67 (1997) (citing testimony of the Director of
the National Institute of Mental Health in 1996 that “no biomedical justification [exists] for
differentiating serious mental illness from other serious and potentially chronic disorders of the
nervous system such as stroke, brain tumor, or paralysis”). Some may argue that individuals with
alcohol and drug dependence are responsible for the initial use of alcohol or drugs that resulted in
their condition. The volitional feature of this condition is, according to experts, not significantly
different from many other chronic health conditions, such as hypertension and diabetes, that have a
strong genetic contribution and for which an individual’s choices related to diet, exercise, and stress
control will affect whether he or she develops the condition or exacerbates it through noncompliance
with treatment. McLellan, supra, at 1690, 1693.
103
KENNEDY & RAMSTAD, supra note 92, at 9.
104
Id. at 19-21; see also Barry et al., supra note 4, at 409-15 (outlining the history of
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring the cost of parity and conflicting actuarial estimates
that doomed early parity legislation; concluding that academic research on the costs of parity under a
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state parity laws and the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program
(FEHBP) parity requirements 105 demonstrated that spending does not
increase measurably when coverage is provided under a managed care
system. 106 The single significant economic effect has been improved
financial security for consumers who have lower out-of-pocket costs. 107
On the flip side, the overwhelming cost of untreated addiction and
mental health disorders convinced some employers and insurers that

managed care system resulted in a favorable Congressional Budget Office (CBO) score and changed
perceptions in Congress that comprehensive parity would not “break the bank”); H.R. REP. No. 110374(I) at 39-44 (2008) (CBO cost estimate of the House-passed parity bill, H.R. 1424).
105
The FEHBP parity standard, as implemented in 2001, required plans to cover all categories
of mental health and substance use disorders listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM IV) to the extent authorized in a treatment plan, and it regulated all aspects
of in-network benefits—including cost-sharing, deductibles, lifetime and annual dollar limits, and
day and visit limitations—requiring identical levels of coverage. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., FEHB
Program Carrier Letter, No. 2000-17, 2-4 (Apr. 11, 2000), available at fehb.opm.gov/
carrier/carrier_letters/2000/2000-17.pdf. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) required
benefit levels for mental health/substance use disorders to be comparable to medical treatment based
on the category of care (e.g., inpatient hospital, specialist office visits, diagnostic tests, and
pharmacy benefits) and encouraged a continuum of services, including partial hospitalization and
intensive outpatient care. Id. at 3-4. OPM also encouraged the use of a range of benefit
management techniques to “mitigate the cost impact” of expanding access to services, including the
use of a MBHO to establish provider networks and manage services. Id. at 3; see generally Colleen
L. Barry & M. Susan Ridgley, Mental Health and Substance Abuse Insurance Parity for Federal
Employees: How Did Health Plans Respond?, 27 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155 (2008)
(describing the parity standards and FEHB plan development in response to the parity standards).
Following the enactment of the Parity Act, OPM extended parity standards to out-of-network
providers, U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., FEHB Program Carrier Letter, No. 2008-17, 1-2 (Nov. 10,
2008), available at fehb.opm.gov/carrier/carrier_letters/2008/2008-17.pdf, and continued to require
coverage of all categories of mental health and substance use disorder care included in an authorized
treatment plan; U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., FEHB Program Carrier Letter, No. 2009-08, 5 (Apr. 20,
2009), available at fehb.opm.gov/carrier/carrier_letters/2009/2009-08.pdf. OPM has also advised
participating plans that they must comply with the Parity Act’s non-quantitative treatment limitation
standards. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., FEHB Program Carrier Letter, No. 2010-06, 6 (Apr. 7,
2010), available at www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/healthcare/carriers/ 010/2010-06.pdf.
106
See Susan T. Azrin et al., Impact of Full Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity for
Children in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 119 PEDIATRICS e452, e457 (2007)
(reporting that spending on mental health and substance abuse services for children decreased
significantly in three of seven plans and slightly decreased in the remaining four plans); Howard H.
Goldman et al., Behavioral Health Insurance Parity for Federal Employees, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1378, 1378, 1383 (2006) (reporting that plan spending on mental health and substance abuse services
for adults significantly decreased in three of seven FEHBP plans as a result of parity and moderately
decreased or increased for the other four plans).
107
See Azrin et al., supra note 106, at e457; Sherry Glied & Alison Cuellar, Better Behavioral
Health Care Coverage for Everyone, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1415, 1416 (2006) (noting that FEHB
parity led to out-of-pocket spending reductions and operated “just as insurance coverage should
[by] . . . shift[ing] costs from out-of-pocket spending to the insurance company (and eventually to
very small increases in insurance premiums) without leading to an increase in the use of services”);
Goldman et al., supra note 106, at 1384 (reporting a significant reduction in out-of-pocket spending
associated with implementation of parity in five of the seven FEHBP plans).
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health insurance equity was too expensive not to provide. 108 Employer
data confirmed that untreated mental health and substance use disorders
contributed significantly to lost productivity and absenteeism in the
workplace 109 and that limitations on behavioral healthcare services could
increase employers’ direct and indirect healthcare costs. 110
In brief, health insurance standards for mental health and substance
use disorders did not meet basic standards of equality and fairness and
failed to reflect contemporary science and medicine. Individuals with
addiction and mental health disorders were unquestionably more
vulnerable to discrimination, and special legislative protection was
needed to constrain the impulse of insurers to shift health costs to the
individuals who suffered from those conditions, their employers, and the
public health, social services, and criminal justice systems. Congress
enacted parity legislation because these diverse interests convinced
lawmakers that insurance expansion was, in the words of Professor
Deborah Stone, a “moral opportunity.” 111 Consumers, health providers,
advocates, and personally invested members of Congress helped change
the “cultural understanding” of addiction and mental health disorders and
the role insurance should play in covering the cost of that care. 112 Their
evidence of “inequality” challenged “the fundamental principle of
actuarial fairness upon which most insurance operates.” 113 Congress
ultimately recognized that individuals with addiction and mental health
disorders deserved the same level of health and financial security
provided to those who suffer from other medical conditions. 114

108

KENNEDY & RAMSTAD, supra note 92, at 20; Barry et al., supra note 4, at 418 (explaining
that business and insurance groups that had historically opposed parity agreed to negotiate on a bill,
in part because they had become aware of the additional medical costs associated with untreated
mental disorders).
109
Stephen P. Melek, National Business Group on Health—Summary of Findings on the State
of Employer-Sponsored Behavioral Health Services, BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ADVISOR, Mar. 2007,
available at publications.milliman.com/periodicals/bha/pdfs/national-business-group-health-BH0330-07.pdf. The Parity Act Interim Final Rule describes the substantial costs associated with reduced
employee productivity caused by depression (on the order of $31 billion to $51 billion annually) and
cites research findings that mental illness causes more days of work loss and work impairment than
other chronic conditions such as diabetes and lower back pain. 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5423 (Feb. 2,
2010).
110
Melek, supra note 109.
111
Stone, supra note 46, at 29-34 (1999) (describing the political mechanisms by which
insurance is expanded to cover more individuals and problems in mutual aid arrangements).
112
Id. at 35-37 (describing how individuals and social reformers use insurance to alleviate
problems).
113
Id. at 43.
114
Id. at 44-46 (observing that “American political culture almost defines inequality as an
adverse event itself, something that must be remedied as soon as it is revealed”); see also Crossley,
supra note 24, at 106-07 (explaining that parity legislation is motivated by the desire to protect a
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ACHIEVING EQUITY BUT RETAINING DISPARATE STANDARDS

Congress’s goal in enacting the Parity Act was to equalize insurance
coverage for behavioral health and medical conditions, but Congress’s
remedy was not without compromise. Congress adopted two important
standards that have created interpretive problems related to the reach of
the Parity Act.
First, employer-based insurance plans retain the right to make the
fundamental threshold choice to not provide any coverage for mental
health or addiction treatment 115 and also to define the conditions and
services that would be offered for mental health and substance use
disorders, limited only by the standards of the Parity Act itself and by
state law. 116 The House-passed parity bill would have required all large
employer-based plans that offered coverage for addiction or mental
health services to cover all medically necessary mental health conditions
and addiction disorders listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 117 to prevent discrimination based on diagnosis. The

historically disadvantaged group as well as the government’s interest in ensuring economic costs
resulting from untreated mental health are avoided through insurance coverage).
115
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(b)(1) (Westlaw 2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(b)(1) (Westlaw 2012); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(b)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . as
requiring a group health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health
insurance coverage to provide any mental health or substance use disorder benefits . . . .”).
116
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(b)(2), (e)(4)-(5); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(b)(2), (e)(4)-(5); 42 U.S.C.A. §
300gg-26(b)(2), (e)(4)-(5). Plans that offer mental health or substance use disorder benefits are
statutorily authorized to define the “terms and conditions” of the plans, which certainly would
include the services provided. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(e)(4)-(5); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(e)(4)-(5); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(e)(4)-(5). That authority is explicitly restricted “except as provided in
subsection (a),” which sets out the Parity Act’s non-discrimination standard. 26 U.S.C.A. §
9812(b)(2); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(b)(2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(b)(2). The statutory definition of
mental health and substance use disorder benefits similarly authorizes plans to define the services for
mental health conditions and substance use disorders, again in accordance with federal and state law.
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(e)(4)-(5); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(e)(4)-(5); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(e)(4)-(5).
See discussion infra accompanying notes 243-270. According to the National Conference on State
Legislatures, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia currently regulate insurance coverage of
substance use and/or mental health services. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws
Mandating or Regulating Mental Health Benefits (Dec. 2012), www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?
tabid=14352. The standards differ significantly, with laws requiring either “parity” to varying
degrees, mandated minimum levels of coverage or mandatory offers of such coverage. Id. Federal
law does not preempt state standards that provide greater protection than federal law. Id. In
addition, the “scope of services” to be provided is also governed by federal law, i.e., the Parity Act
itself and, arguably, any additional rights afforded under a robust enforcement of the ADA. See
discussion infra accompanying notes 250-260 regarding the Parity Act’s standards relating to scope
of services.
117
H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. §§ 102(d), 103(d), 104(d) (2008). The House provision was
modeled after the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program (FEHBP). See supra note 105. The
Senate bill contained no provision that governed the scope of coverage, leaving that determination to
the individual health plan. See generally S. 558, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (2007).
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final bill did not include this provision, and it also permitted plans to
determine which, if any, conditions would be covered. 118 This facially
discriminatory standard 119 was mitigated by the law’s preemption
standard, which ensures that state laws mandating the coverage of
addiction and mental health services remain in effect, 120 and by the nondiscrimination standards imposed by the Parity Act itself. Early reports
indicate that employers have not taken advantage of this significant
loophole to reduce the types of mental health/substance use disorder
diagnoses covered by plans. 121 The landscape could change depending
upon the standards in the final parity rule.
Second, but less clearly discriminatory, health plans retain the right
to make medical management decisions that could continue to limit or

118

See supra note 116 and accompanying text. The official rationale for adopting or dropping
certain provisions in the final Parity Act legislation is not available because the House- and Senatepassed versions of the bills were reconciled without a formal House-Senate conference or
Conference Report. See Laurence Reich, The Continuing Saga of Mental Health Parity: The
MHPAEA Interim Final Rules, NYU REV. EMP. BENEFITS 12-7-12-8 (2010). See Barry et al., supra
note 4, at 418 (explaining that opponents to incorporating the FEHBP’s DSM standard in the parity
bill attacked that standard by directing attention to specific conditions that seemed non-medical and
suggesting that inclusion would lead to unnecessary care). House sponsors ultimately conceded this
issue, allowing the health plan to determine which conditions would be covered. Barry et al., supra,
at 419.
119
See, e.g., New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 305 (3d Cir.
2007) (holding that a law that “singles out methadone clinics for different zoning procedures is
facially discriminatory under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act”); MX Grp., Inc. v. City of
Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 345 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[B]lanket prohibition of all methadone clinics from
the entire city is discriminatory on its face.”).
120
Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2007, 75
Fed. Reg. 5410, 5418 (Feb. 2, 2010) (“The preemption provisions of section 731 of ERISA and
section 2723 of the PHS Act (added by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA) and implemented in 29 CFR 2590.731(a) and 45 CFR 146.143(a)) apply so that the
[Parity Act] requirements are not to be ‘construed to supersede any provision of State law which
establishes, implements, or continues in effect any standard or requirement solely relating to health
insurance issuers in connection with group health insurance coverage except to the extent that such
standard or requirement prevents the application of a requirement’ of [the Parity Act].”). This
constitutes the “narrowest” of state law preemption, insofar as existing state mandates would not
prevent the application of the Parity Act, although insurers may go beyond state minimums to
comply with the Parity Act). Id. The preemption standard is only a partial remedy. Apart from
wide variations in state parity laws regarding the types of benefits covered, diagnoses included, and
eligible populations, these laws, under ERISA, apply only to employer plans purchased in the
commercial market and not to self-insured employer plans. Indeed, this gap rendered state parity
laws inadequate and provided a rationale for enactment of federal parity standards. See Barry et al.,
supra note 4, at 410-11; H.R. REP. 110-374(I), at 30-31 (2007).
121
According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the Parity Act’s effect
on the coverage of mental health/substance use disorders, 91% of the employer respondents (nearly
40% of those surveyed) reported that their most popular plan covered the same broad diagnoses in
both the 2008 and current year plan. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EMPLOYERS’
INSURANCE COVERAGE MAINTAINED OR ENHANCED SINCE PARITY ACT, BUT EFFECT OF COVERAGE
ON ENROLLEES VARIED 11-12 (2011).
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deny care. 122 Although insurers manage the services offered in other
medical contexts, 123 and could not be prevented from doing so in the
behavioral health context, 124 practitioners were wary that the failure to
regulate those standards would perpetuate inequity and undermine the
promise of parity. 125 The Senate-passed bill, which contained weaker
consumer protections than the House-passed bill, would have preserved
many of these practices. It explicitly allowed plans to negotiate separate
reimbursement or provider rates and service delivery systems for
different benefits; to manage the provision of mental health and
substance use disorder services through “utilization review, authorization
or management practices, the application of medical necessity and
appropriateness criteria applicable to behavioral health” and contracting
with network providers; and to apply parity standards “in a manner that
takes into consideration similar treatment settings or similar
treatment.” 126 Congress dropped these provisions in the final parity
legislation.

122

Medical management standards are contemplated by the statutory language requiring
disclosure of “the criteria for medical necessity determinations made under the plan with respect to
mental health or substance use disorder benefits.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(a)(4) (Westlaw 2012); 29
U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(4) (Westlaw 2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(a)(4) (Westlaw 2012).
123
INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COSTS 28-29
(2012) (describing medical plan benefit design to include, among other items, utilization
management, identification of provider networks, and approaches designed to influence the use of
services, such as prior authorization).
124
The economic impact analysis of the Parity Act Interim Final Rule emphasized that
“medical management and managed care techniques will help control any major cost impact
resulting from [the Parity Act] and these regulations.” Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5425 (Feb. 2, 2010). The regulating
agencies reviewed a study that examined parity under FEHBP and found that managed behavioral
health strategies had, in part, controlled consumer response to reduced cost-sharing (the moral
hazard problem) and would likely operate in the same way under the Parity Act. Id. at 5424-25.
125
See KENNEDY & RAMSTAD, supra note 92, at 16 (citing testimony of Dr. Steven
Sharfstein, Exec. Dir., Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Balt., Md.); see also Letter from Scott Rauch,
President of McLean Hosp., to Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Apr. 30, 2010), available at
www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB30-5327.pdf (stating that the oversight of specialized managed care
carve-out firms is “far more rigorous for behavioral health than . . . for medical/surgical services. . . .
Clinicians are constantly questioned and micro-managed by Carve-Out reviewers as to the medical
necessity of a given behavioral health service”); Katherine C. Nordal, Exec. Dir. for Prof’l Practice,
Am. Psychological Ass’n Practice Org., to Dep’ts of Treasury, Labor & Health & Human Servs., 4-5
(May 3, 2010), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB30-5089.pdf (citing intensive medical
management, including intrusive telephone interviews used to discourage psychologists and their
patients from seeking needed care).
126
S. 558, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (2007). This “clarifications” section separated these medical
management features from the financial restrictions and treatment limitations that were subject to the
Senate-passed bill’s non-discrimination standard. Id. Under the Senate-passed bill, as long as a plan
did not provide separate or more restrictive financial requirements or treatment limitations to mental
health and substance use disorder benefits, it would have been able to retain separate and distinctive
plan designs for those benefits. Id. § 2(a).
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These compromises undoubtedly paved the path to passage of the
Parity Act. At the same time, they created fodder for a contentious
regulatory process 127 and uncertainty as to how far health plans must go
to equalize coverage of behavioral health services. As discussed in Parts
II and III, the Parity Act’s regulatory standards address both issues: the
scope of mental health and addiction treatment services and medical
management standards. The law’s ability to end pervasive insurance
discrimination will turn largely on the interpretation and enforcement of
the provisions regarding these two issues.
II.

MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT: NONDISCRIMINATION STANDARDS

The Parity Act and its regulations set out rules that address
treatment limitations, financial requirements, and medical management
features that have both limited and increased the cost of addiction and
mental health care for consumers. 128 The law’s measure of equality is
whether the plan’s standards for these features are “comparable” for
behavioral health and medical care. The law requires health plans to (1)
identify treatment limitations and financial requirements that are imposed
on the addiction or mental health benefit, (2) compare those specific
standards to the coverage that applies to medical services, and (3) modify
any standard that is “separate from or more restrictive than” those
imposed on medical services. The Parity Act’s Interim Final Regulations
(IFR) set out a separate comparability standard for medical management
(and other non-quantifiable treatment limitations) requirements. It bars
any limitation on mental health or addiction services that is not
comparable to or is applied more stringently than medical management
standards for medical services. A detailed description of these standards
is provided to assist employers and carriers in developing paritycompliant plans and to equip plan participants and providers to assert
their rights to appropriate treatment and payment.

127

See Barry et al., supra note 4, at 423 (noting tendency of interest groups to refight policy
battles at the rule-making stage, which occurred even though groups were united to win passage of
the law).
128
See Barry et al., supra note 47, at 630, 632 (describing benefit limitations as “demandside” rationing, as compared to “supply-side” rationing through managed care); see also Frank et al.,
supra note 10, at 116-18. (outlining the ways in which medical management can use administrative
tools to discourage enrollment by making partial hospitalization difficult to access or contracting
with residential providers that are located in inaccessible or undesirable neighborhoods; noting that
managed care has many more ways to “affect the effective coverage of a plan” than the earlier
design features of cost-sharing and benefit limits).
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As a civil rights statute, the Parity Act addresses disparate
treatment, 129 although no proof of intent to discriminate is required to
invalidate insurance practices that do not conform to the IFR’s “proof” of
comparability. Apart from the permission to exclude all coverage for
mental health and substance use disorders, 130 the Parity Act’s regulatory
standards are most akin to Title VII sex discrimination standards. Those
standards require employer-based health insurance to provide
comparably comprehensive services for men and women, 131 without
consideration of actuarial data, 132 and bar both disparate treatment and
disparate-impact discrimination. 133 The Title VII standard, which
requires health plans to provide equally comprehensive services for men
and women even though certain reproductive health services are unique

129

It is helpful to analogize the parity standard to other civil rights standards for purposes of
determining whether a specific practice constitutes a violation. A formulation that focuses on
“separate,” “more restrictive,” and “non-comparable” standards fits comfortably within the actions
that constitute discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (Westlaw 2013)
(requiring payments under any health insurance plans to be applied to disability due to pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to
other disabilities); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(d) (Westlaw 2013) (making it unlawful for an employer to
make fringe benefits, including health benefits, available to spouses or families of employee of one
gender if the same benefits are not provided to spouses or families of opposite gender employees).
130
Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b), (d) (making it unlawful for an employer to exclude employees
of one gender from benefits that the other gender receives, and “[a]n example of such an unlawful
employment practice is a situation in which wives of male employees receive maternity benefits
while female employees receive no such benefits”).
131
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983)
(holding that health insurance benefits for pregnancy-related conditions that provide more
comprehensive services for female employees than for the wives of male employees violate Title
VII).
132
29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (“It shall not be a defense under title VII to a charge of sex
discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the
other.”); City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978) (holding
that there was no cost justification defense under Title VII). Similarly, the Parity Act does not allow
different standards based on the cost of mental health or substance use disorder services. The only
cost-related variations that are allowed under the Parity Act relate to cost exemptions from coverage.
A plan may be granted an exemption from coverage for a single plan year if the plan’s actual cost of
providing both medical and mental health/substance use disorder benefits increases by 2% in the first
six months of coverage (and by 1% in each subsequent plan year). 26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(c)(2)
(Westlaw 2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(c)(2) (Westlaw 2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(c)(2)
(Westlaw 2012).
133
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“[Title VII] proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”); see
also EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (2000), available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
benefits.html#N_93_. The Parity Act does not, however, invalidate plan management practices that
have a disparate impact on the delivery of mental health/substance use disorder services. 26 C.F.R.
§ 54.9812-1T(c)(4)(iii) ex. 3 (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(iii) ex. 3 (Westlaw 2013);
45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(4)(iii) ex. 3 (Westlaw 2013); FAQs About Affordable Care Act
Implementation Part VII and Mental Health Parity Implementation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last
accessed Feb. 21, 2013), www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-aca7.html.
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to one gender, suggests that a similar conceptual dilemma—the lack of a
perfect “apples-to-apples” comparison between behavioral health and
medical care—need not be fatal to enforcement.
A.

QUANTIFIABLE TREATMENT LIMITATIONS AND FINANCIAL
REQUIREMENTS

The Parity Act and regulations 134 target financial requirements and
treatment limitations that prevent individuals from accessing the care
they need and that ignore the chronic nature of mental health and
substance use disorders. Treatment limitations “include limits on the
frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage or other
similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment.” 135 Financial
requirements include “deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-ofpocket expenses,” with the exception of aggregate lifetime financial
limits or annual financial limits, which the law addresses separately. 136

134

The Parity Act regulations, which, as of the time of publication, constitute an Interim Final
Rule (IFR), provide substantial guidance for implementation. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T (Westlaw
2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712 (Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136 (Westlaw 2013). The
Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services issued the IFR on February 2,
2010, after receiving comments pursuant to a Request for Information, issued in April 2009.
Request for Information Regarding the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 19155 (Apr. 28, 2009). The agencies issued the rule as
an IFR without notice of proposed rulemaking based on a “good cause” finding that prompt
guidance was needed to ensure compliance with the Parity Act, which had already gone into effect
as of October 3, 2009. 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5419 (Feb. 2, 2010). The IFR standards were applicable
to health plans as of July 1, 2010, id. at 5410, and the agencies sought comments on a number of
issues that would be addressed in the final rule. Although sub-regulatory guidance has been issued
on several points, a final rule has not been promulgated. See Coal. for Parity, Inc. v. Sebelius, 709 F.
Supp. 2d 10, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2010) (setting out the regulatory process). A coalition of managed
behavioral health organizations challenged the promulgation of the IFR, asserting that the
Departments did not have authority under the Administrative Procedure Act to issue the rule as an
IFR, and sought an injunction enjoining implementation of and vacating the IFR and requiring
reissuance of the Rule under notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 15-16. The district court
dismissed the action, holding that the Departments properly invoked the “good cause” exception to
notice-and-comment rulemaking based on congressional authorization to issue interim final rules,
the need for prompt guidance, the interim nature of the IFR, and the lack of evidence of dilatory
action on the part of the Departments. Id. at 24. Although the Coalition of Parity’s action was based
on an alleged APA procedural violation, its chief goal was to challenge the substantive reach of the
regulations. See id. at 15-16; infra note 166 and accompanying text.
135
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(a)(3)(B)(iii) (Westlaw 2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(iii)
(Westlaw 2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(a)(3)(B)(iii) (Westlaw 2012). The IFR also includes
“days in a waiting period” as a “treatment limitation.” 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(a) (Westlaw 2013);
29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a) (Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(a) (Westlaw 2013).
136
See infra note 147 and accompanying text. Examples of lifetime or annual financial limits
would be a $100,000 cap on insurance reimbursement for addiction care over the individual’s
lifetime, or a $50,000 cap on insurance reimbursement for the plan year.
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The non-discrimination standard for these “quantitative” 137
treatment or financial features is operationalized as a mathematical
formula. An insurance plan that provides a benefit for mental health or
addiction disorders is prohibited from imposing a separate financial
requirement or treatment limitation that is applicable only to the mental
health or addiction benefit. In addition, the plan is prohibited from
imposing a more restrictive financial requirement or treatment limitation
on mental health or addiction disorders than the predominant level
imposed on substantially all medical benefits. 138 The law defines
“predominant level” as the “most common or frequent of such type of
[treatment] limit or [financial] requirement.” 139 The regulations further
define “substantially all” to mean at least “two-thirds” of all
medical/surgical benefits in a classification, and the “predominant level”
to mean the level that applies to more than half of medical benefits in
that classification that are subject to the specific treatment limitation or
financial requirement. 140 Recognizing that many plans “carve out” their
mental health/substance use disorder benefits from the medical benefits,
the regulations explicitly construe the mental health/substance use
disorder and general medical benefits as a combined benefit in a single
plan. 141
The parity regulations provide the framework for operationalizing
the “more restrictive” comparison standard. The IFR establishes six
general classifications and requires all financial requirements and
treatment limitations for addiction or mental health benefits to be
137

“Quantitative” standards are those in which a limitation is stated with a numerical value
(e.g., thirty days of treatment or a $30 copayment). See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(a) (Westlaw 2013);
29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a) (Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(a) (Westlaw 2013).
138
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(a)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(3)(A) (Westlaw
2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(a)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2012).
139
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(a)(3)(B)(ii); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg26(a)(3)(B)(ii).
140
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(3) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3) (Westlaw
2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3) (Westlaw 2013). The calculation of the “predominant” and
“substantially all” level is based on the plan’s projected payments for medical/surgical benefits in the
classification for the plan year. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(3)(i)(C); 29 C.F.R. §
2590.712(c)(3)(i)(C); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)(i)(C). The IFR permits a health plan to use “any
reasonable method” to determine the dollar amount expected to be paid under a plan for purposes of
calculating the medical/surgical benefits that are subject to a particular treatment limitation or
financial requirement as well as the level of such requirement. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(3)(i)(E);
29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3)(i)(E); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)(i)(E).
141
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(e)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(e)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(e)(1);
Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg.
5410, 5418 (Feb. 2, 2010) (noting the need for this construction to avoid a potential evasion of the
law by offering mental health or substance use disorder benefits in a separately administered carveout arrangement that has no medical benefits, even though the latter are otherwise provided by the
group plan).
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compared with the benefits for medical services in each classification.
The classifications are inpatient in-network, inpatient out-of-network,
outpatient in-network, outpatient out-of-network, prescription drugs, and
emergency care. 142 The analysis proceeds by identifying three items: (1)
any treatment limitation or financial requirement that exists for the
addiction/mental health benefit; (2) the service to which the feature
applies (outpatient, inpatient, prescription drug, or emergency care); and
(3) whether the plan is an in-network or out-of-network plan. That
feature is then compared with the medical benefit under the same service
and provider network system.
Parity compliance focuses on two questions. First, does the “type”
of treatment limitation or financial requirement imposed on mental
health/substance use disorder benefits apply to two thirds of the medical
benefits? If that “type” of financial requirement or treatment limitation
does not apply to “substantially all” medical benefits, it violates the
Parity Act’s prohibition against “separate” standards for mental
health/substance use disorder benefits.
Second, what “level” of that limitation or requirement applies to
more than half of the medical benefits in that same classification? To
determine the predominant level, the plan looks to the projected plan
payments of medical/surgical benefits. If no single level applies to more
than one half of the medical benefits (at least 51%), the plan may
combine the different levels until the combination amounts to more than
half. 143 The predominant level is the least restrictive of the levels within
the combination, and only that level may be imposed on mental
health/substance use disorder benefits in that classification. 144
An example will help clarify the analysis. Consider a large retail
employer that offers its employees a health plan that provides coverage
for hospital care, primary physician and specialty care, preventive
services, laboratory and x-ray procedures, surgical procedures,

142

26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(2)(ii)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A); 45 C.F.R. §
146.136(c)(2)(ii)(A). Out-of-network standards are included because health plans that provide
coverage for medical benefits through out-of-network providers are required by law to also provide
mental health/ substance use disorder benefits through out-of-network providers. 26 U.S.C.A. §
9812(a)(5) (Westlaw 2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(5) (Westlaw 2012); 42 U.S.C.A. §300gg26(a)(5) (Westlaw 2012).
143
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(3)(i)(B)(2) (Westlaw 2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3)(i)
(B)(2) (Westlaw 2012); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)(i)(B)(2) (Westlaw 2012). In combining levels,
the regulations permit a plan to start with the most restrictive level and add less restrictive levels
until it reaches over half of projected plan payments.
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(3)(i)(B)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3)(i)(B)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136
(c)(3)(i)(B)(2).
144
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(3)(i)(B)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3)(i)(B)(2); 45 C.F.R. §
146.136(c)(3)(i)(B)(2).
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physical/occupational/speech therapy, chiropractic care, acupuncture,
home health services, reproductive health, emergency services,
prescription drugs, and mental health and substance use disorder care.
The plan requires a $20 copayment for each outpatient counseling visit
for mental health or addiction treatment provided by an in-network
provider. It requires several different copayments for medical services
provided on an outpatient, in-network basis: preventive services and
reproductive health office visits have no copayment; primary care visits
for treatment of an illness or injury have a $10 copayment; laboratory
work has a $15 copayment; physical/occupational/speech therapy,
chiropractic care, and acupuncture have a $20 copayment; and specialty
care visits have a $25 copayment. The plan estimates $1 million in plan
payments for medical benefits in the outpatient, in-network
classification. Chart 1 shows the various copayment levels and
hypothetical projected portion of plan payments 145 for each category of
outpatient, in-network medical benefits.
CHART 1
Service

Preventive or
Reproductive
Health

Primary
Care Visit
for Physical
Illness or
Injury

Lab
Work

Physical,
Occupational,
or Speech
Therapy;
Chiropractics;
Acupuncture

Specialty
Care

CoPayment

$0

$10

$15

$20

$25

% of
Projected
Plan
Payments

20%

20%

20%

20%

20%

Under the parity analysis, the $20 copayment for addiction/mental
health outpatient care is compared to the copayment scheme for
outpatient, in-network medical benefits. If a copayment is not required
for substantially all of those medical benefits, the addiction/mental health

145

This proportion of projected plan payments is selected for ease of example. The IFR
offers a more nuanced example of projected plan costs. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812 (c)(3)(iv); 29 C.F.R. §
2590.712(c)(3)(iv); 45 C.F.R. § 1146.136(c)(3)(iv).
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copayment is a “separate” standard and, thus, invalid. Since 80% of all
outpatient, in-network medical benefits require a copayment, one may be
imposed on addiction/mental health benefits.
The analysis then proceeds to determine if the “level” of the
copayment for mental health/substance use disorders ($20 in this
example) matches the predominant level of the plan’s medical benefits.
No single copayment level equates to more than 50% of the projected
copayments for outpatient, in-network medical benefits (i.e., each
copayment level constitutes 25% of the total projected copayments). 146
Consequently, the plan must combine levels, starting with the most
restrictive level ($25), to reach a composite level that is applied to more
than one-half of projected plan payments for outpatient, in-network
medical benefits. In this example, only 50% of outpatient medical
benefits have a copayment of $20 or more. Adding the next copayment
level ($15) reaches 75% of outpatient medical benefits and, therefore,
meets the required percentage of projected plan payments. Of the
combined copayment levels, the least restrictive amount—and therefore
the predominant level—is the $15 copayment. Accordingly, a $20
copayment for mental health/substance use disorder services violates the
Parity Act, because it is more restrictive than the predominant level.
This same analysis applies to all other quantifiable treatment
limitations and financial requirements (with slight variations for annual
and lifetime limitations) 147 to determine whether, for example, a thirty146

Of the $1 million in projected plan costs, services that have a copayment amount to
$800,000 in plan costs. Since each copayment level is estimated to have 20% of the projected plan
payment, each constitutes 25% of those projected costs.
147
The law defines “aggregate lifetime limit” as “a dollar limitation on the total amount that
may be paid with respect to such benefits under the plan with respect to an individual . . . .” 26
U.S.C.A. § 9812(e)(1) (Westlaw 2012); see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(e)(1) (Westlaw 2012); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(e)(1) (Westlaw 2012). The law defines “annual limit” as “a dollar limitation
on the total amount of benefits that may be paid with respect to such benefits in a 12-month period
under the plan with respect to an individual . . . .” 26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(e)(2); see also 29 U.S.C.A. §
1185a(e)(2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(e)(2). The law retains separate standards for these features
because the Mental Health Parity Law of 1996 barred discrimination in annual and lifetime limits for
mental health care, and Congress retained that framework under the expanded law. An annual or
lifetime dollar limit that applies to mental health or addiction benefits is compared with the dollar
amount of any such limit imposed on medical benefits. To the extent no such limitations exist for
medical benefits, an annual or lifetime cap may not be imposed on mental health or addiction
benefits. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(a)(1), (2); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(1), (2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg26(a)(1), (2). If an annual or lifetime limit applies to substantially all (two thirds of) medical
benefits, then a plan is required either to apply the limit imposed on medical benefits to both those
benefits and the mental health or addiction benefit or to apply a separate annual or lifetime cap to the
mental health or addiction benefit that is no less than the dollar level imposed on medical benefits.
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(a)(1), (2); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(1), (2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(a)(1), (2).
The law sets out an additional standard if different annual or lifetime limits are imposed on different
categories of medical benefits. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(a)(1), (2); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(1), (2); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(a)(1), (2).
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session limit on outpatient mental health counseling or a two-day limit
on adolescent residential treatment is permissible under parity.
Returning to the example of the retail employer’s health plan, it contains
no annual limit on the number of outpatient sessions for physician and
specialty care, preventive services, and reproductive health care; a thirtysession limit for physical/occupational/speech therapy; a fifteen-session
limit for chiropractic care and acupuncture; and a fifteen-session limit for
outpatient mental health/substance use disorder care. To determine if a
plan may impose a fifteen-session limit on behavioral health services, the
plan would first determine whether two thirds of the outpatient
medical/surgical benefits have a day limit. If they do not, a treatment
limitation may not be imposed on outpatient mental health/substance use
disorder care. If this threshold is satisfied, then a determination must be
made whether a fifteen- or thirty-session limit is the predominant level,
and that same level must be applied to mental health/substance use
disorder outpatient services.
1.

Cross-Classification Parity

A second significant regulatory standard revolves around the six
classifications and addresses, in part, the scope of addiction or mental
health services that must be provided under the Parity Act. The IFR
requires that, to the extent a plan provides a benefit for an addiction
disorder or a mental health condition in one of the six classifications, it
must provide a benefit for the condition in each of the classifications in
which a benefit is provided for medical care. 148 Thus, if prescription
medication for an addiction or a mental health disorder is included under
the health plan, then inpatient and outpatient care (both in and out-ofnetwork) and emergency care for that disorder must also be provided if
the plan offers medical services benefits in each of those classifications.
As explained in the IFR, the exclusion of benefits in a classification for a
mental health or addiction condition that is otherwise covered for a
medical condition constitutes “a limit, at a minimum, on the type of
setting or context in which treatment is offered.” 149
Insurance plans question how this requirement can be reconciled
with the Parity Act’s separate regulatory standard that allows a plan to
offer benefits for one or more mental health condition or substance use

148

26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(2)(ii)(A) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A)
(Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(2)(ii)(A) (Westlaw 2013).
149
Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75
Fed. Reg. 5410, 5413 (Feb. 2, 2010).
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disorder without providing benefits for any other such condition. 150 The
IFR notes that the rule requiring parity across classifications “does not
require an expansion of the range of mental health conditions or
substance use disorders covered under the plan”; it just requires
comparable care for those covered conditions. 151 Although inherently
logical, this standard, according to some insurance industry observers,
exceeds the statutory standard, which permits the denial of all coverage
for addiction or mental health care and gives the plan discretion to
determine the scope of services provided. 152 Industry representatives
have objected to being required to cover a broad range of services by
virtue of plan coverage of prescription mental health medications, which,
as explained above, is typically a benefit that is included in the same
formulary as medications for purely physical conditions. 153
2.

Cumulative Treatment Limitations and Financial Requirements

The IFR also regulates (1) financial requirements that impose a
cumulative dollar amount as either a threshold needed to trigger
insurance reimbursement—most commonly a deductible—or a cap on an
insured’s payment obligation (total out-of-pocket expenses), and (2)
treatment limitations that similarly cumulate to restrict the quantity of
care covered, such as an annual or lifetime day or visit limit. 154 The IFR
bars separate cumulative standards for medical and mental
health/substance use disorder benefits in any classification. 155 Instead, it
requires the application of a single cumulative level for both sets of
benefits such that any care the individual receives for either medical or
mental health/substance abuse disorder care is counted against a single
financial amount and/or treatment limitation. 156 The IFR notes that a
150

26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(e)(3)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(e)(3)(i); 45 C.F.R. §
146.136(e)(3)(i).
151
Interim Final Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 5413.
152
Letter from Anthony M. Kotin, supra note 62, at 8-9; Letter from Justine Handelman,
supra note 56, at 11-12.
153
Letter from Anthony M. Kotin, supra note 62, at 9-10; Letter from Justine Handelman,
supra note 56, at 12; Letter from Sheryl Bonner, Boon-Chapman Benefit Administrators, 1-2 (May
3, 2010), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB30-5303.pdf.
154
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(a) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R.§ 2590.712(a) (Westlaw 2013); 45
C.F.R. § 146.136(a) (Westlaw 2013).
155
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(3)(v); 29 C.F.R. 2590.712(c)(3)(v); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)
(v).
156
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(3)(v); 29 C.F.R. 2590.712(c)(3)(v); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136
(c)(3)(v). The regulatory agencies adopted this formulation notwithstanding insurance carrier
suggestions that the dollar amount of a single combined deductible could be set higher than two
separate but equal deductibles and thereby increase out-of-pocket costs required to access any health
service. See, e.g., Letter from Anthony M. Kotin, supra note 62, at 12. The “parity” response to this
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single cumulative requirement is more consistent with the Parity Act’s
underlying policy that “mental health and substance use disorder benefits
are integral components of comprehensive health care and generally
should not be distinguished from medical/surgical benefits.” 157
3.

Prescription Drug Standards

As described in Part I, prescription drugs are widely used for mental
health care and are generally included in the same formulary as
medications for medical conditions, rather than managed separately in a
carve-out plan. 158 These medications, like others, are often placed in
tiers based on factors such as cost and efficacy, and without regard to
whether they are prescribed for a mental health or substance use disorder.
The IFR modeled a special parity rule on existing practice to guide the
structuring of the formulary so that, within multiple tiers, the financial
requirements (generally the portion paid by the plan) for all medications
will be the same. 159 Under the IFR, a formulary will comply with parity
to the extent it applies different financial requirements to different tiers
of drugs based on reasonable factors—cost, efficacy, generic versus
brand name, and mail-order versus pharmacy pick-up—without regard to
whether a drug is generally prescribed for a medical condition or a
mental health/substance use disorder. 160
The regulations do not directly address the imposition of
quantitative treatment limitations on drugs used to treat mental health or
substance use disorders. Any such limitation, e.g., refill restrictions or
quantity dispensed, presumably would be evaluated within each tier to
determine if it applies to substantially all drugs in the tier and, if so,
exceeds the predominant limitation level. The IFR standard does,
however, explicitly require a plan’s formulary to comply with provisions
governing non-quantitative treatment limitations, 161 which, as described

benefit design is that two separate deductibles would require an individual who needs both kinds of
care to pay a deductible that is higher than that paid by an individual who needs only
medical/surgical care. Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5415 (Feb. 2, 2010). In addition, two identical but separate deductibles
impose a disproportionate cost on persons seeking mental health/substance use disorder care based
on the proportional cost of that singular benefit, typically 2% to 5% of the total plan costs, compared
to all other services constituting the medical/surgical benefit. Id.
157
Interim Final Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 5415.
158
See supra notes 82 and accompanying text.
159
Interim Final Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 5415.
160
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812(c)(3)(iii) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R.§ 2590.712(c)(3)(iii) (Westlaw
2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)(iii) (Westlaw 2013).
161
See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812(c)(3)(iii); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3)(iii); 45 C.F.R. §
146.136(c)(3)(iii).
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below, expose the health plan to further scrutiny if it imposes different
authorization standards for medications that treat substance use
disorders, excludes expensive or investigational medications for the
treatment of mental health/substance use disorders, or classifies a
medication differently than a drug used to treat medical conditions.
B.

NON-QUANTIFIABLE TREATMENT LIMITATIONS

One of the most contentious IFR provisions is the designation of
plan management standards as a form of “treatment limitations.” 162 The
regulations apply parity requirements to medical management standards,
which as noted above are not explicitly regulated by the statute, except
for notification requirements. 163 The IFR recognizes, like many mental
health and substance use disorder health providers and consumers, that
the “scope and duration” of care are restricted by a plan’s “nonquantitative” treatment limitations (NQTLs) as much as by treatment
limitations expressed numerically (QTLs) and, therefore, regulates
NQTLs as a form of “treatment limitations.” 164 Among the insurance
practices identified as an NQTL in the regulations are medical
management standards, including medical necessity or appropriateness
standards; experimental or investigative treatment standards and
preauthorization requirements; prescription drug formulary standards;
standards for admission to provider networks and reimbursement rates; a
plan’s method for determining usual, customary, and reasonable charges;
“fail first” policies or “step therapy” protocols; and exclusions based on
the failure to complete a course of treatment. 165 While most observers
162

See, e.g., Letter from Justine Handelman, supra note 56, at 7 (“One of the more
unexpected requirements of the Regulation is the requirement for parity for non-quantitative
treatment limits. Early legislative versions of the Act included parity rules for medical management,
but those rules were not included as part of the final Act. Indeed, the Act only contemplates easily
quantifiable treatment limits.”). But see Carter & Landau, supra note 1, at 43 (stating, in a preregulatory analysis of the Parity Act, that “[n]othing in the [Act] prohibits group health plans from
imposing preexisting condition, pre-certification and medical necessity requirements on mental
health benefits, provided those requirements are no more stringent than those required for medical
benefits”). Indeed, a coalition of managed behavioral health organizations sued the Department of
Health and Human Services to enjoin the implementation of the Interim Final Rule, asserting that the
Secretary exceeded her authority under the statute by promulgating medical management standards.
Coal. for Parity, Inc. v. Sebelius, 709 F. Supp. 2d. 10, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2010).
163
See supra text accompanying note 126. The Departments noted in the IFR that
“[t]reatment limitation is not comprehensively defined under the statute. . . . [I]t is not limited to
such types of limits [as limits on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or
other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment].” Interim Final Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at
5413.
164
Id. at 5416.
165
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(4)(ii) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R.§ 2590.712(c)(4)(ii) (Westlaw
2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(4)(ii) (Westlaw 2013) (identified as an illustrative list). The Institute
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expected that plans would be allowed to impose medical management
standards on addiction and mental health benefits, 166 the regulations
authorize a heightened degree of scrutiny to ensure that those standards
do not undermine the delivery of care that is on par with medical care. 167
The test for comparing NQTLs for addiction/mental health care to
medical benefits looks to whether the specific standard is “comparable
to” or “applied more stringently than” the standard for medical services
benefits within the requisite classification. Unlike the arithmetical
formula for evaluating quantitative treatment limitations, the IFR does
not explicitly require that an NQTL be applied to “substantially all” (or
any specific portion of) the medical services before it may be applied to
mental health or addiction services. 168 Instead, the IFR establishes an
undefined comparability standard that applies to both the facial design
and application of the NQTL. It provides that the

of Medicine has identified many of these features as components of benefit design for ACAprescribed “essential health benefits,” lending support to the IFR’s coverage of these components in
mental health/substance use disorder care. INST. OF MED., supra note 123, at 30-31 (outlining
benefit design).
166
For example, the plaintiff in Coalition for Parity, Inc. v. Sebelius alleged that the statutory
language of the Parity Act defined treatment limitations to be solely “quantitative” in nature.
Complaint at ¶ 39, Coal. for Parity, Inc. v. Sebelius, 709 F. Supp. 2d. 10 (D.D.C. 2010) (Civil No.
10-527). The IFR standards for non-quantitative treatment limitations are confusing and ambiguous
and fail to recognize that “medical and behavioral health benefits cannot be compared on an ‘apples
to apples’ basis,” id. ¶ 40, and the concept of non-quantitative limitations is without “bounds,”
extending to such standards as provider network composition and reimbursement rates. Id. ¶ 47.
Responding to this alleged surprise, the court noted that behavioral health providers did, indeed,
have an opportunity to address these points with the federal regulatory agencies as they developed
the IFR. Sebelius, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 14-15. In addition, the legislative history of the parity bill
reveals Congress paid significant attention to this issue, even if it did not use the IFR terms of
quantitative and non-quantitative treatment limitations. See discussion supra accompanying notes
122-126.
167
The broad reach of the regulations is supported by actuarial data presented by the Parity
Implementation Coalition in response to the regulatory agencies’ April 2009 Request for
Information. Letter from the Parity Implementation Coalition to Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Program Operations, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Dep’t
of Labor 4-5, 8-9 (May 28, 2009). For example, anecdotal information indicated that
disproportionately low fee schedules are common for providers of mental health and substance use
disorders and accounted for the lack of access to care for children, adolescents, and seniors. Id. at
17. In addition, consumers of mental health/substance use disorder services were nearly twice as
likely to receive care through out-of-network providers, thereby driving up the cost of their care
through out-of-pocket expenditures. Id.
168
The IFR preamble notes that “[t]he test is applied somewhat differently to non-quantitative
treatment limitations.” Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5413 (Feb. 2, 2010). The regulatory agencies have issued guidance that
takes the position that the parity standard for NQTLs “does not require applying a simple arithmetic
test to compare the treatment of mental health or substance use disorder benefits to the treatment of
medical/surgical benefits.” FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part VII and Mental
Health Parity Implementation, supra note 133. See infra note 277 for an alternative interpretation.
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processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used in
applying the nonquantitative treatment limitation to mental health or
substance use disorder benefits in the classification [must be]
comparable to, and . . . applied no more stringently than, the
processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used in
applying the limitation with respect to [medical/surgical benefits] in
the classification . . . . 169

A safe harbor provision exists to allow variations in NQTL
standards if “recognized clinically appropriate standards of care . . .
permit a difference.” 170 Although the IFR does not define “recognized
clinically appropriate standards of care,” such standards should arguably
be based on national criteria or peer-reviewed research that meet
standards of validity and replicability rather than practice standards
developed solely by the health plan. 171
To facilitate an evaluation of the comparability of the underlying
factors used to make these management determinations, the law and
regulations explicitly require a health plan to disclose the criteria for
medical necessity determinations regarding mental health or addiction
benefits to any current or potential participant, beneficiary, or contracting
provider upon request. 172 Curiously, the statute and regulations do not
require the disclosure of the medical necessity criteria (or other medical
management standards) for medical services that the plan uses as the
comparator for the mental health or addiction benefit.
To fill this gap, the regulating agencies have issued subregulatory
guidance confirming that, under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), the medical necessity criteria for both medical
and mental health/substance use disorder benefits are considered plan

169

26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(4)(i) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R.§ 2590.712(c)(4)(i) (Westlaw
2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(4)(i) (Westlaw 2013).
170
See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(4)(i); 29 C.F.R. 2590.712(c)(4)(i); 45 C.F.R. §
146.136(c)(4)(i). A similar medical necessity standard is imposed in the Title VII health benefit
context when a plan seeks to justify a standard that has a disparate impact based on gender. See
EEOC, supra note 133 (“If the employer applies facially neutral standards to exclude treatment for
conditions or risks that disproportionately affect either men or women . . . the employer must show
that the standards are based on generally accepted medical criteria.”). Scientific support for the
employer’s criteria should be provided. Id.
171
Letter from Parity Implementation Coalition to Office of Health Plan Standards &
Compliance Assistance and Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. 16-17 (Apr. 30, 2010); Sara
Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically Necessary?, 340 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 229, 232 (1999) (identifying the level of evidence an insurer should be required to
produce to overturn a treating physician’s decision on medical necessity grounds).
172
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(a)(4) (Westlaw 2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(4) (Westlaw 2012); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(a)(4) (Westlaw 2012); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(d)(1) (Westlaw 2013); 29
C.F.R. § 2590.712(d)(1) (Westlaw 2013), 45 C.F.R. § 136(d)(1) (Westlaw 2013).
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documents and must be made available upon request. 173 ERISA benefit
determination standards require a plan to inform, upon request,
participants and beneficiaries of any internal rule, guideline, protocol, or
similar criterion used in denying a health benefit as well as an
explanation of the scientific or clinical judgment that supports any
medical necessity determination. 174
In addition, a claimant who
challenges a plan’s adverse benefit determination is also entitled to all
“documents, records and other information relevant to the claimant’s
claim for benefits.” 175 Both disclosure requirements should encompass
the comparable medical/surgical standards relied upon by the plan. Plans
that are not subject to ERISA, such as state and local government health
plans, may be subject to state law that authorizes similar access.
Looking again at the example of the retailer’s health plan will help
clarify the general framework for applying this standard. 176 Suppose all
plan members are required to obtain preauthorization to obtain outpatient
care for a mental health or substance use disorder from an in-network
provider, regardless of the type of service (e.g., outpatient, intensive
outpatient, diagnostic and psychological testing, day treatment,
electroconvulsive therapy). If no outpatient in-network medical service
is subject to a preauthorization requirement, it cannot be imposed on
outpatient services for mental health or addiction care. The mental
health/addiction standard is separate from and not “comparable” to the
medical standard. 177 If, however, the plan applies a pre-authorization
requirement for some outpatient medical services—physical,
occupational, or speech therapy; home nursing visits; and outpatient
surgery—as well as all outpatient behavioral health services, subregulatory guidance makes clear that the plan must articulate the criteria
it has used to determine which services will be subject to the NQTL and
173

FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part VII and Mental Health Parity
Implementation, supra note 133; see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SELF-COMPLIANCE TOOL FOR PART
7 OF ERISA: HIPAA AND OTHER HEALTH CARE-RELATED PROVISIONS 29, available at
www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/cagappa.pdf (stating that if denial is based on medical necessity criteria,
criteria for both the mental health/substance use disorder benefit at issue and medical benefits in the
same classification must be provided within thirty days upon request).
174
29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(g)(1)(v), 2520.104b-1 (Westlaw 2013). A plan administrator
who fails or refuses to mail the information within thirty days after the request may be held
personally liable and fined by a court in an amount up to $100 per day from the date of inaction. 29
U.S.C.A. § 1132(c)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
175
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iii), (3). “Relevant” information includes any document that
was relied upon in making the benefit determination and any document submitted, considered, or
generated in the course of making the benefit determination, even if not relied upon. Id. § 2560.5031(m)(8).
176
For further analysis on implementation questions, see discussion infra Part III.B.
177
See generally FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part VII and Mental
Health Parity Implementation, supra note 133.
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demonstrate that those same criteria are applied across both behavioral
health and medical services. 178 A finding of comparability is more likely
to be established if the plan’s strategies, processes, and factors are based
on an array of medically recognized standards and protocols, and the
application of such factors results in the NQTL being imposed in a
differentiated fashion to specific health benefits across both medical
conditions and mental health/substance use disorders. 179
Sub-regulatory guidance also clarifies that a plan will not satisfy the
comparability standard simply by ensuring an NQTL also applies to at
least one or several medical/surgical services. 180 Indeed, federal
regulators have stated that a plan would not likely satisfy the parity
standard if, as in the example above, all behavioral health outpatient
services, but only a limited number of outpatient medical services, were
subject to preauthorization. According to the guidance, “it is unlikely
that the processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, and other factors
considered by the plan in determining that those three (and only those
three) outpatient medical/surgical benefits require prior authorization
would also result in all outpatient [behavioral health] benefits needing
prior authorization.” 181 Such a pattern could indicate that the plan is
singling out behavioral health care for more restrictive treatment rather
than developing a set of standards that is applied consistently across all
medical and behavioral conditions. 182

178

Id.
Id. Question 4, for example, describes with approval a plan that uses a wide range of
factors to design medical management techniques based on medical literature and professional
standards. Id. The factors include cost of treatment, high cost growth, variability in cost and quality,
elasticity of demand, provider discretion in determining diagnosis or type or length of treatment,
clinical efficacy of proposed treatment, licensing and accreditation of providers, and claims type
with a high percentage of fraud. Id. The use of these factors results in an NQTL (prior authorization
in this case) being imposed on some, but not all, mental health and addiction services and a wide
range of medical conditions. The regulators indicate this approach seems to implement NQTLs in a
comparable fashion and does not apply the standards more stringently in practice. Id.
180
See generally id. The absence of a numerical threshold standard for the application of
NQTLs means that the existence of the same type of NQTL requirement for any medical benefit
arguably amounts to a “comparable” NQTL, thereby satisfying the “comparability as written”
standard. See discussion infra Part III.B for further guidance on comparability determination.
181
Id. (emphasis added).
182
A similar analysis has been applied in a Title VII health benefits case. The court in
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., a Pregnancy Discrimination Act case, examined whether the exclusion
of prescription contraceptives from the plan’s formulary violated the Act. Erickson v. Bartell Drug
Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2001). The court acknowledged that the plan’s
formulary excluded prescription drugs other than prescription contraceptives, but the defendant
could not provide a “consistent theory” to explain the various inclusions and exclusions. Id. at 1275.
The court concluded that a “generally comprehensive” policy that excluded prescription
contraceptives “circumscribed the treatment options available to women, but not to men.” Id. at
1276.
179
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Sub-regulatory guidance additionally indicates that the “as applied”
prong of the comparability standard requires evidence of disparate
implementation practices, as opposed to disparate results. Take, for
example, the retail employer’s plan that requires preauthorization for all
inpatient medical and behavioral health services, but whose utilization
review agents routinely approve seven days of care for medical services
and only two days for mental health/substance use disorder care prior to
requiring a treatment plan. The regulating agencies construe this
disparate treatment to violate the “applied no more stringently”
provision, because the standard applied to benefits for all mental
health/substance use disorders is stricter than the standard applied to
medical services. While a clinically appropriate standard of care could
justify different prior authorization standards or practices for “individual
conditions or treatments,” the lack of differentiation among behavioral
health conditions suggests the application of a blanket standard that is
not based on a clinical standard of care. 183 On the other hand, a
uniformly applied utilization management standard would not violate the
“applied no more stringently” standards even if the application resulted
Evidence of disparate treatment in
in a disparate impact. 184
implementation may be found in a plan’s utilization management
protocols or through its claims data. 185
C.

ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS

The Departments of Labor (DOL), Health and Human Services
(HHS), and Treasury have shared responsibility under the Parity Act,
183

FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part VII and Mental Health Parity
Implementation, supra note 133.
184
Id. (explaining that a concurrent review requirement that is imposed on all medical and
mental health/substance use disorder services that have a high variation in the length of stay would
not violate the “applied no more stringently” standard even if it applies to a higher percentage of
behavioral health conditions than medical conditions).
185
For example, the Chair of the Psychiatry Department for the Baltimore Washington
Medical Center has observed that, while all health plans require preauthorization for inpatient care
for both medical and behavioral health conditions, the process for obtaining approval is distinctively
different. Testimony of Dr. Steven Daviss, Congressional Forum Testimony on the Implementation
and Enforcement of MHPAEA, Chevy Chase, Md. (June 26, 2012) (on file with author). Emergency
department staff who seek approval to admit a suicidal patient spend thirty to forty-five minutes
answering a litany of questions and waiting for data to be entered into electronic record systems,
while the staff seeking approval for admission of a person with a medical condition spend no more
than two to three minutes providing the name of the patient, insurance number, and reason for
hospitalization. Id. Similarly, I have investigated whether a plan’s exclusion for court-ordered
treatment would violate the Parity Act. Although the exclusion, as drafted in the plan, may apply to
all medical and behavioral health care, a review of claims would reveal if the exclusion is applied
more stringently for substance use disorder care, which is frequently required as an alternative to
incarceration.
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along with the states, to enforce the statute. 186 DOL and Treasury
generally enforce the parity requirements for private, employment-based
group health plans. HHS has direct enforcement authority over nonfederal governmental plans, i.e., those sponsored by state and local
government employers. 187 State insurance departments have primary
enforcement responsibility regarding issuers of health insurance in the
individual or group market, although HHS may intervene to enforce
rights if it finds that a state has failed to “substantially enforce” the
law. 188
Apart from the authority to issue regulations and coordinate
interpretations and rulings, the Parity Act provides virtually no
framework for enforcement. 189 Congress did not create a private right of
action in the Parity Act, and it is also unlikely that courts would find an
implied right of action under Cort v. Ash 190 absent clear congressional
intent. 191 Persons who have been harmed by a plan’s violation of the
Parity Act are afforded the remedies provided under ERISA, the Public
Health Services Act, and the Internal Revenue Code. These laws provide

186

Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 512(d), 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (requiring all three agencies to
promulgate regulations); id. § 512(f) (requiring a memorandum of understanding to ensure that
regulations, rulings, and interpretations that apply to matters that more than one Secretary has
responsibility for will be administered to have the same effect). The three federal agencies operate
pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding created after enactment of the Mental Health Parity
Act of 1996. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNDERSTANDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MENTAL
HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008, 1 (May 9, 2012), available at
www.healthreformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/faq-mhpaeaimplementation.pdf (citing 64 Fed. Reg.
70164 (Dec. 15, 1999); implementing the Memorandum of Understanding for Enforcement of the
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
and other federal statutes).
187
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(b)(1)(B) (Westlaw 2012).
188
Id. § 300gg-22(a)(1), (2). HHS may impose a civil penalty for health insurance issuers and
non-federal governmental employers that fail to comply with the Parity Act. Id. § 300gg22(b)(2)(A), (B), (C).
189
The amendment to ERISA authorizes the federal agencies to issue guidance on the
requirements of the Parity Act and to provide assistance concerning the law’s requirements and
available assistance from state consumer and insurance agencies. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(g) (Westlaw
2012).
190
422 U.S. 66, 78-85 (1975) (establishing standards for finding an implied right of action).
191
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001). Courts have concluded that other
legislative acts affording healthcare protections to individuals through amendments to subchapter I
of ERISA and/or the Public Health Services Act do not create a private right of action in light of
ERISA’s comprehensive remedial scheme and the absence of legislative intent. See, e.g., Howard v.
Coventry Health Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (finding no
private right of action under Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act); O’Donnell v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (D. Wyo. 2001) (holding that a review of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s enforcement provisions reveals no
congressional intent to create private right of action and that enforcement is vested with states or
Secretary of HHS).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

45

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3

224

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

three enforcement tools that, as described below, are limited in scope by
ERISA’s remedial scheme. 192
1.

ERISA Civil Actions

Plan participants and beneficiaries with self-insured or fully insured
group health plans may bring actions under ERISA’s civil enforcement
provisions 193 to challenge Parity Act violations. The two actions that
will likely be brought are actions challenging a denial of benefits 194 and
actions to enforce employee benefit rights—including the Parity Act
rights—under ERISA. 195 The first action gives an individual the right to
challenge the underlying standard that was the basis for the denial of
coverage or reimbursement as being non-compliant with the Parity Act.
The second action gives individuals the right to challenge a wide range
of non-compliant plan design features that may not be amenable to a
claims-denial challenge or that can be addressed prospectively, without
awaiting a service denial.
In an action for denial of benefits—the most common vehicle to
enforce rights under ERISA—an individual would assert a two-pronged
challenge to a denial of care based on medical necessity, utilization
review standards, or covered services. The complainant would allege
first that an erroneous application of the plan’s medical necessity criteria
or other standard resulted in the denial of care or reimbursement, and
second that the application of non-comparable medical necessity criteria
or other medical management standards violated the Parity Act.
Consumers with “non-grandfathered” group health plans, as defined by
192

A detailed analysis of the enforcement options is beyond the scope of this Article, as is an
examination of state remedies that may exist for violations of state health insurance laws that are not
preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2012) (providing the
preemption standard).
193
Id. § 1132. Government employees cannot challenge Parity Act violations under ERISA,
because ERISA does not regulate federal, state and local government plans. Id. §§ 1003(b)(1),
1002(32).
194
The provision, in pertinent part, authorizes a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil
action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” Id. §
1132(a)(1)(B).
195
Id. § 1132(a)(3) (authorizing a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring a civil action
“(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of [Subchapter I] or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce
any provisions of [subchapter I] or the terms of the plan”). Courts have found, for example, that
claims for alleged violations of the non-discrimination provisions of the Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), found in subchapter I of ERISA, may be brought under §
1132(a)(3). Werdehausen v. Benicorp Ins. Co., 487 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a
HIPAA claim challenging rescission of an insurance policy for failure to disclose a pre-existing neck
condition may be brought under ERISA civil action § 1132(a)(3)).
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the ACA, have enhanced appeal rights that ensure an independent review
of a plan administrator’s denial of claims or services. 196 ERISA limits
the remedies for violations of benefit denials to equitable relief: the
provision of the benefit allowed under the plan or reimbursement for cost
of the care. 197 Compensatory or punitive damages are not available, 198
and the ERISA civil enforcement provision preempts all other claims and
remedies not expressly incorporated by Congress, including state extracontractual remedies. 199
The dispute resolution process for benefit denial claims, known as
“internal appeals and external review,” generally requires plan
participants and beneficiaries for both self-insured and fully insured
group health plans to first appeal an adverse benefit decision through the
Adverse
health plan’s internal administrative appeal process. 200
decisions may then be appealed to an external independent review
organization (IRO), 201 a private entity that conducts a review of a plan’s
196

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2719, 124 Stat. 119,
139 (2010), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-19 (Westlaw 2012). A “grandfathered” health plan is one in which
a person was enrolled on the date of the ACA’s enactment and that is exempt from certain ACA
requirements. Grandfathered plans are governed under section 1251 of the Affordable Care Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 18011 (Westlaw 2012), and Interim Final Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 34538 (June 17,
2010), amended by 75 Fed. Reg. 70114-01 (Nov. 17, 2010). The exclusion of grandfathered health
plans means that beneficiaries of a self-insured employer plan do not have access to an independent
external review of the plan’s adverse decision, unless provided by the plan. Any appeal would be
through the filing of a civil action. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (Westlaw 2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5031(c)(2) (Westlaw 2013). These same internal appeal/external review standards apply to issuers of
individual health policies. 45 C.F.R. § 147.136 (Westlaw 2013).
197
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (Westlaw 2012) (stating that participant or beneficiary
has a civil enforcement action to recover “benefits due to him” and enforce or clarify rights “under
the terms of the plan”).
198
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).
199
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 n.4 (2004) (“[A] state cause of action that
provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism
conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive.”); Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (concluding that the ERISA enforcement scheme is the
exclusive remedy for plan participants and beneficiaries “asserting improper processing of a claim
for benefits, and that varying state causes of action for claims within the scope of [the ERISA
enforcement scheme] would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress”).
200
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1133 (Westlaw 2012); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(b), (c), 2590.7152719(b)(2)(ii)(F) (Westlaw 2013) (providing that a claimant will be deemed to have exhausted an
internal claims process if the plan does not conform to regulatory requirements beyond de minimis
violations that do not cause harm or prejudice to the claimant and that the plan can demonstrate were
for good cause or beyond the plan’s control). For a discussion of the rationale for the exhaustion
requirement, which is not a statutory requirement under ERISA, see, e.g., Makar v. Health Care
Corp., 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1989); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co, 846 F.2d 821, 825-26 (1st
Cir. 1988), (finding that exhaustion was required unless the administrative route was futile or the
remedy was inadequate); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that
exhaustion was required unless the administrative route was futile or the remedy was inadequate).
201
Professor Nan Hunter has characterized external/independent review organizations as both
private sector administrative tribunals and public law arbitration panels. Hunter, supra note 22, at
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internal adverse benefit determinations. 202 Federal regulations require
IROs to apply existing state external review practices that meet the
federal threshold for consumer protection 203 or, alternatively, new federal
standards that establish basic consumer protections and that also apply to
self-insured group plans not subject to state insurance law dispute
resolution procedures. 204
Both state and federal external review standards authorize claimants
to challenge adverse decisions that fall under the parity law’s nonquantitative treatment limitation standard. 205 Challenges to a plan’s
application of a purely quantitative treatment limitation or financial
requirement, such as a maximum day limitation or cost-sharing
calculation under the “substantially all”/”predominant” standard, would
likely require a review of contract provisions and, therefore, would not
be subject to external review by an IRO.
External review determinations are binding on an insurer, which
must provide benefits and make payments in compliance with the IRO
determination regardless of whether the plan seeks judicial review of that

151. They have the benefit of streamlined procedures that extend some public law values into the
marketplace, but they afford claimants fewer procedural protections than administrative or judicial
proceedings. Id. at 152.
202
26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T(a)(2)(vii), (c), (d) (Westlaw 2013), 29 C.F.R. § 2590.7152719(a)(2)(vii), (c), (d) (Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R. 147.136(a)(2)(vii), (c), (d) (Westlaw 2013).
203
The federal threshold for state review process compliance requires consumer protections
that, at a minimum, meet the standards of the NAIC Uniform Model Act. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.98152719T(c)(1) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(1) (Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R.
147.136(c)(1) (Westlaw 2013). The requirements include, among other items, standards to ensure
randomized assignment of cases to an IRO, safeguards against a conflict of interest that would
influence an IRO’s independence and the right of claimants to submit additional information not
presented to the plan administrator for the internal appeal. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T(c)(2); 29
C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 147.136(c)(2).
204
See generally Roy F. Harmon, An Assessment of New Appeals and External Review
Processes—ERISA Claimants Get “Some Kind of a Hearing,” 56 S.D. L. REV. 408 (2011)
(expressing concern that the new process-oriented standards will not accomplish the regulatory goals
and concluding that a claims dispute process does not address the core limitations ERISA poses for
claimants, e.g., deference to plan administrator determinations, preemption of state law claims and
limited remedies).
205
State external review processes must allow appeals of any adverse determination that
relates to medical necessity, appropriateness, healthcare setting, level of care, or effectiveness of a
covered benefit, or one that is based on the determination that the requested care is experimental or
investigational treatment. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T(c)(2)(i), (xvi) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R. §
2590.715-2719(c)(2)(i), (xvi) (Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R. 147.136(c)(2)(i), (xvi) (Westlaw 2013).
The federal external review standards apply to adverse decisions that involve “medical judgment.”
26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T(d)(1)(ii)(A), (B); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(d)(1)(ii)(A), (B); 45
C.F.R. § 147.136(d)(1)(ii)(A), (B). The regulatory agencies have stated that “medical judgment”
includes “whether a plan is complying with the non-quantitative treatment limitation provisions of
the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act.” Group Health Plans and Health Insurance
Issuers: Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes, 76 Fed. Reg.
37,208, 37,216 (June 24, 2011).
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decision. 206 A plan participant or beneficiary may file a civil action
seeking judicial review of a plan administrator’s adverse benefit
determination upheld on review by the IRO. 207 The claimant must raise
any parity claims and offer supporting evidence in the plan grievance and
during the IRO review process, as the administrative record is generally
the exclusive source of evidence for judicial review in a benefit denial
action under ERISA. 208
The second ERISA action, under the “enforcement of rights”
provision, gives an individual a basis to challenge a plan for “any act or
practice” that violates ERISA provisions, including the Parity Act, and
obtain appropriate equitable relief. The broad reading afforded this
provision 209 should allow a plan participant/beneficiary to challenge a
wide range of violations, including more restrictive financial
requirements and quantitative treatment limitations as well as nonquantitative treatment limitations. For example, an action under this
provision could challenge a plan’s failure to apply comparable standards
for the admission of behavioral health providers to an in-network
provider panel or the plan’s behavioral health provider reimbursement
rates. These NQTL standards affect a participant’s cost of care via
higher out-of-pocket expenses for out-of-network providers, but a

206

26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T(c)(2)(xi), (d)(2)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(xi),
(d)(2)(iv); 45 § C.F.R. 147.136(c)(2)(xi), (d)(2)(iv) (contemplating a plan’s authority to seek judicial
review of adverse IRO decision even though ERISA does not explicitly authorize plan appeals in
benefit denial actions); see Harmon, supra note 204, at 419 (noting that these standards “appear to
avoid a constitutional issue by including a proviso for judicial review”).
207
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (Westlaw 2012); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(a), (h),
2590.715-2719(c)(2)(xi) (Westlaw 2013).
208
See ROBERT M. GOLDICH ET AL., ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 8-11 to 8-13 (4th
ed. 2012); see, e.g., Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (holding that a district court may review the administrative record under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review only, but it may admit additional evidence on de novo review; if
procedural irregularities do not constitute flagrant violations but prevent the development of a full
administrative record, the court may take additional evidence to “recreate what the administrative
record would have been” under an abuse-of-discretion review); Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
300 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that the court has flexibility to admit additional
evidence in limited circumstances when administrative record is insufficient to provide de novo
review); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(holding that a court has discretion to allow evidence not before administrator “only when
circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo
review of the benefit decision,” and identifying such good-cause circumstances); Perry v. Simplicity
Eng’g, 900 F.2d 963, 966-67 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a de novo review in benefit denial suits is
a review of the administrator’s decision “without deference to the decision or any presumption of
correctness, based on the record before the administrator”).
209
See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) (holding that individual plan
beneficiaries could bring claim for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3), statutory language is
broad enough to encompass claims for fiduciary breach, and § 1132(a)(3) creates “‘catchalls,’”
providing ‘appropriate equitable relief’ for ‘any’ statutory violation”).
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violation may be more difficult to remedy under a denial of benefits
claim. 210 Similarly, a challenge to a plan’s limited scope of services
would be most appropriate under this cause of action as opposed to a
denial of benefits claim; an action to enforce the “terms of the plan”
could, by virtue of its limitations, be interpreted to not include the very
services the participant would seek to obtain under the comparability
standard. Finally, plan participants/beneficiaries could assert a plan-wide
challenge to coverage exclusions, such as exclusions for court-ordered
treatment, that often single out care for substance use disorders. 211
The relief that may be awarded under the ERISA civil enforcement
provisions is limited to injunctive and “other appropriate equitable”
relief. Although no court has addressed the scope of the equitable relief
in a health care challenge similar to one brought under the Parity Act, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the standard in suits alleging a violation
of fiduciary duties to mean relief that is typically available in equity,
such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory
damages. 212 A second legal issue that will arise under this action is
whether a participant would be required to exhaust a plan’s internal
review procedures prior to filing an action in court. 213 These and other
issues will require further analysis as litigation unfolds.
2.

Department of Treasury: Federal Excise Tax

Plan beneficiaries may also seek enforcement through a federal
excise tax. 214 The tax liability is generally $100 per day for each
210

The circuits are split on whether a plaintiff can bring claims simultaneously under §
1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3), with a majority holding that, under Varity Corp., 516 U.S. 489, the
existence of a denial of benefits claims precludes the right to bring an “enforcement of rights” action
because the latter claim is available only if the beneficiary cannot avail herself or himself of another
ERISA remedy. Compare Korotynska v. Metro. Life. Ins. Co., 474 F.3d 101, 106-07 (4th Cir. 2006)
(stating that a “great majority” of circuits preclude simultaneous claims and citing the relevant
cases), with Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
that claims may be brought simultaneously because plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim under §
1132(a)(3) is the only claim available to address a violation if a benefit denial claim fails under §
1132(a)(1)(B)).
211
The GAO has reported that 28% of plans responding to a survey to identify plan
exclusions for mental health/substance use disorders in the plan year 2010 or 2011 included an
exclusion for court-ordered treatment that is a condition of probation or parole or as an alternative to
incarceration. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE:
TREATMENT EXCLUSIONS IN EMPLOYERS’ HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 3 (2012).
212
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-57, 260 (1993).
213
Courts are split on whether exhaustion of plan review processes is required in actions
brought under § 1132(a)(3) to enforce ERISA’s non-discrimination provision. See GOLDICH ET AL.,
supra note 208, at § 8-45.
214
26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(a), (e)(1) (Westlaw 2012). The health plan would be liable for any
violation involving a multi-employer plan. Id. § 4980D(e)(2).
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individual to which the failure to comply with the Parity Act applies and
continues for the duration of the non-compliance period. 215 However,
the amount of the tax is subject to limitation, or is disallowed entirely, in
several circumstances. First, the penalty does not apply if the IRS
determines that the employer did not know of the failure to comply with
the Parity Act, and, exercising reasonable diligence, would not have
known that the failure existed. 216 A penalty also will not apply if the
violation is due to reasonable cause and not willful negligence, and the
employer corrected the violation within thirty days of the date it knew or
should have known of its failure to comply with the Parity Act. 217
Correction requires that the failure must be undone to the extent possible
and the individual to whom the failure applies must be placed in as good
a financial position as she or he would have been in absent the failure. 218
To the extent a failure is not corrected prior to the date a notice of
examination of tax liability is sent to the employer, the tax penalty can be
no more than $2,500 or, for violations that are more than de minimis,
$15,000. 219 Finally, the excise tax may be waived or reduced if the
employer’s failure to comply with the Parity Act was due to reasonable
cause and not willful neglect, and the tax would be excessive relative to
the failure involved. 220 Although historically the enforcement of excise
tax obligations has not been aggressive, the Internal Revenue Service is
beginning to take excise tax assessments seriously.221
3.

Regulatory Agency Investigations and Enforcement

Both the DOL and HHS may initiate investigations of Parity Act
violations. DOL complaints may be filed by any person or brought
pursuant to the Secretary’s investigative authority, 222 and the Secretary
may file actions to enforce the Parity Act. 223 HHS has more limited

215

Id. § 4980D(b)(1). The non-compliance period runs from the date such failure to comply
first occurs until the date of correction. Id. § 4980D(b)(2).
216
Id. § 4980D(c)(1).
217
Id. § 4980D(c)(2).
218
Id. § 4980D(f)(3).
219
Id. § 4980D(b)(3).
220
Id. § 4980D(c)(4).
221
PAUL J. ROUTH, WELFARE BENEFITS GUIDE: HEALTH PLANS AND OTHER EMPLOYER
SPONSORED BENEFITS § 10:14 (2011).
222
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1134(a) (Westlaw 2012). The Secretary may also require benefit plans
to submit any information to the DOL that is required under the Parity Act. See id. § 1029(a).
223
Id. § 1132(a)(5) (giving the DOL Secretary the same authority as plan participants under §
1132(a)(3), except that the DOL may not file actions against health insurance issuers that offer
health insurance coverage in connection with group plans, which enforcement remains the authority
of state insurance departments).
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authority to initiate investigations of alleged violations by health
insurance issuers, but it may take enforcement action and impose civil
penalties if the Secretary determines that a state has failed to
substantially enforce a Parity Act provision. 224
4.

Enforcement Limitations

An estimated 160 parity complaints have been filed with DOL as of
the end of 2011, 225 but no public record of enforcement exists to date.
Enforcement efforts are in their infancy and lack teeth because a final
rule has not been issued. The DOL has adopted a conciliatory approach
with plan administrators, seeking to work through, rather than penalize,
parity violations. 226 Most troubling, the agency requires only “good
faith” compliance for any potentially “gray areas” in the law and
regulations, 227 which may perpetuate the status quo. The DOL has
refused to investigate any complaint that alleges a scope-of-services
violation, citing the lack of regulation on this issue. 228 The agency has
not provided a publicly accessible clearinghouse that delineates the
nature or resolution, if any, of complaints, thus depriving employers and
the public of a source of guidance for compliance. 229 Parity advocates
have complained that the muted enforcement response undermines the
health insurance industry’s imperative and, to some degree, ability to
comply with the Parity Act. This places responsibility for enforcement
in the hands of claimants, who must proceed on a case-by-case basis.
Piecemeal enforcement is uniquely challenging under the Parity
Act. As demonstrated by the above discussion, the regulatory standards

224

42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(a)(2), (b)(2) (Westlaw 2012).
Telephone Interviews with Carol McDaid, Co-Chair, Parity Implementation Coal. (Aug.
3, Dec. 1, 2011).
226
James Mayhew, Dir. Div. of Regulations & Policy, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Remarks at Meeting on HHS Parity Implementation (July
12, 2012).
227
Telephone Interview with Katina Lee, Senior Emp. Benefits/Law Specialist, Dep’t of
Labor Office of Health Plan Standards & Compliance Assistance (June 22, 2012).
228
Katina Lee, Senior Emp. Benefits/Law Specialist, Dep’t of Labor Office of Health Plan
Standards & Compliance Assistance, Remarks at Meeting of Parity Implementation (June 11, 2012).
229
See Telephone Interviews with Carol McDaid, supra note 225. My experience with filing
a complaint with the DOL’s District Office in Maryland to address an alleged cost-sharing violation
revealed significant flaws in the investigatory process. The complaint was not reviewed for nearly
three months, and the Benefits Advisor failed to investigate the complaint for another six months.
See Complaint re: Johns Hopkins HealthCare LLC, filed Sept. 19, 2011) (on file with author). The
Department of Labor instituted a new complaint filing process in 2011 that is designed to address the
agency’s delays in reviewing and responding to complaints. See Request for Assistance from the
Department of Labor, EBSA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, www.askebsa.dol.gov/WebIntake/
Home.aspx?submit=Submit+a+Complaint (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
225
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are complex. A consumer cannot readily determine, for example, if a
plan’s seemingly restrictive cost-sharing requirement or reimbursement
decision that appears restrictive is, in fact, a violation of his or her rights,
because all cost data and criteria required for key compliance
determinations are in the exclusive control of the plan. To enforce the
quantitative standards, a claimant is dependent upon the insurance carrier
or plan to conduct the required plan cost analysis, 230 to do so in good
faith, 231 and to disclose that analysis to justify facially different standards
for mental health/substance use disorder benefits. 232 To evaluate an
NQTL challenge, a plan must be willing to conduct the analysis and
provide all information related to medical benefits with comparable
management standards as well as the “processes, strategies, or
evidentiary standards” that have been used to develop those standards. 233

230

For example, I direct a clinical law practice, the Drug Policy and Public Health Strategies
Clinic, and have worked with students since 2010 to enforce the Parity Act through client
representation and state legislative initiatives. We have investigated three large self-insured
employer plans in Maryland in which the plan administrators had not conducted the required
mathematical analysis to determine whether copayments for outpatient mental health/substance use
disorders were parity compliant. Upon review, two of the three plans amended the financial
requirement upon notification of the violation, and the third revised its subsequent year’s plan
following the filing of a DOL complaint. (Complaint letters on file with author).
231
The regulations authorize plans to use “any reasonable method” to determine the
benchmark levels of medical/surgical benefits that are subject to a financial requirement or
quantitative treatment limitation (and the level of such requirements). 26 C.F.R. § 54.98121T(c)(3)(i)(E) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3(i)(E) (Westlaw 2013); 45 C.F.R. §
146.136(c)(3)(i)(E) (Westlaw 2013). Carriers have taken dramatically different approaches in
calculating cost data, with some using aggregate claims data across all plans they offer to arrive at
the benchmark levels, as opposed to identifying a level for each particular plan. See Letter from
Anthony M. Kotin, supra note 62, at 12. An insurer that uses aggregate data from all plans could
arrive at a different standard than if it relied on cost data for each individual plan. For example, a
self-insured employer in Maryland identified the predominant copayment level for outpatient
behavioral health treatment by combining the data for two different health plans. Taken
individually, the copayment was parity-compliant for one plan but not the second. When the data for
the two plans were combined, however, the cost-sharing in the non-compliant plan appeared to
satisfy parity because its cost data were subsumed in the second plan’s data. See Johns Hopkins
HealthCare LLC 2011 plan data (on file with author).
232
State insurance commissioners review insurance plans for compliance with federal and
state law as a prerequisite to being offered in the state. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-205(a),
(b) (Westlaw 2012). The Nebraska Insurance Department has developed a set of questions that
carriers are required to answer regarding application of the Parity Act for group plans. A carrier is
required to identify, among other items, the predominant level for financial requirements and
treatment limitations in each classification and the process for placing benefits in the six
classifications and for determining the predominant levels; it also must document the mental
health/substance use disorder benefit and all financial requirements and quantitative and nonquantitative treatment limitations. See Nebraska Dept. of Ins. Inquiry Form (on file with author).
233
An analysis of plan practices regarding the application of NQTLs found that MBHO
“carve-out” arrangements consider the parity analysis to be a complex and costly undertaking that is
made more difficult by the need to compare behavioral health standards to multiple, separate
medical plans that they do not control. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SHORT-TERM
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Even if the information were disclosed, a participant’s capacity (or that
of her or his health care provider) to analyze the information for
compliance purposes is often limited by her or his health condition and
urgency to obtain “some” care. While providers are accustomed to
challenging “medical necessity” determinations through a plan’s internal
appeal process, they are generally not equipped to address the more
complex question of whether medical standards are comparable to those
for a behavioral health condition. 234
Furthermore, the external review process for benefit denials, while
an important right, makes systemic oversight of and corrections in a
health plan unlikely, 235 and it risks inconsistent decisionmaking by IROs
who are not bound by a body of external review decisions. 236
Historically, relatively few claimants have taken advantage of state
external review procedures, 237 although those who do seek review have a
significant rate of success. 238 For those using this process, the
complexity of the parity standards will require substantial involvement of
a patient’s treatment provider to use the IRO process effectively and, in
certain cases, assistance from medical experts to interpret evidence of

ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER PARITY
IMPLEMENTATION 4-5 (2012), available at aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2012/mhsud.pdf.
234
Students in my Drug Policy Clinic have developed parity compliance tools to assist
providers in this analysis, but, based on anecdotal information, the availability of the tools has not
increased the level of appeals based on parity violations.
235
Although a determination by an independent review organization is binding on a group
health plan for a specific individual’s claim, Professor Hunter notes that external review systems
operate remarkably without precedent and may not perform the regulatory accountability function of
litigation. Hunter, supra note 22, at 136-37. As of 2006, only three state external review laws
required a “readily accessible body of prior written decisions.” Id. The new federal external review
standards require IROs to “maintain written records and make them available upon request to the
State” but this does not amount to a publicly available set of opinions. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.7152719(c)(2)(xv) (Westlaw 2013). Health plans, as repeat players before IROs, can compile their own
sets of decisions and use them for guidance, creating a significant imbalance between the parties in
an individual case. Hunter, supra, at 137. It is also unclear whether a plan is obligated to amend its
plan design if the IRO determines that a NQTL violates the Parity Act. Generally, the insurance
industry has reported that it responds to external review decisions. Id. at 152. Although industry
behavior has not been studied in the parity context, one MBHO has noted that if medical
management decisions are subject to external review, it may be required to rework a plan design in
the middle of a plan year based on an IRO decision. Letter from Teresa Berman, Vice Pres. &
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Magellan Health Servs., to Dep’ts of Labor, Health & Human Servs., &
Treasury 6 (July 25, 2011), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/86-2719-IFR.pdf.
236
See sources cited supra note 235.
237
Hunter, supra note 22, at 138-40 (noting that procedural requirements like exhaustion of
internal grievance process and adequate notice of process contribute to low rates of use, and that
Medicare’s automatic appeal process results in dramatically higher utilization).
238
Id. at 140 (noting a 40% rate of reversal of internal decisions).
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comparability for medical management standards. 239 Finally, IROs will
be called upon to apply the NQTL standard and determine the
comparability of plan provisions, which involve different analyses than
the typical medical necessity and other plan determinations. IROs
require adequate education and training to carry out that analysis, 240 and
their independence must be monitored, particularly to address the
perception that “repeat players” have an unfair advantage over
patients. 241
The complexity, information control, and capacity factors inherent
in the Parity Act structure call for additional standards that will facilitate
enforcement. Part IV proposes additional enforcement tools, including
annual reporting requirements so that plans demonstrate parity
compliance. At the same time, better enforcement tools will not ensure
equity if the regulatory standards related to scope of coverage and NQTL
comparability determinations are not resolved.
III. REGULATORY CONUNDRUMS AND UNRESOLVED STANDARDS
Notwithstanding the far-reaching potential of the Parity Act, equity
for mental health/substance use disorder care will not be achieved if a
restrictive interpretation of the “scope of services” prevails, or if the
NQTL “comparability” standard remains an elusive concept that cannot
be operationalized. As described in this part, the statutory language and
legislative history of the Parity Act hold the answer to the scope-ofservices interpretation, even though the IFR suggests otherwise.
Clarification of the comparability standard awaits final regulatory
239

For potential barriers to receiving that assistance, see Harmon, supra note 204, at 451
(noting that some healthcare providers may not want to risk alienating health plans with repeated
claims or invest the time in rebutting a plan’s denial; legal community has little incentive to pursue
external appeals because attorney’s fees under ERISA are limited to fees incurred after litigation
commences).
240
Both the insurance industry and consumer advocates have raised concerns about the ability
of IROs to resolve disputes related to NQTLs. MBHOs objected to the application of the federal
external review standards to NQTLs, noting that independent review organizations are not qualified
to undertake the required analysis and issue a determination on plan provisions or benefit design or
criteria. See, e.g., Letter from Teresa Berman, supra note 235, at 6. Parity advocates, on the other
hand, sought a final rule that required “reviews and decisions based on medical necessity and
appropriateness . . . [to be] conducted by an individual with the appropriate medical and clinical
education and training that meets or exceeds the education and credentialing of the treating provider
in the field at issue, and who is currently in active practice and credentialed in the particular field at
issue.” Letter from Parity Implementation Coal. to Dep’ts of Labor, Health & Human Servs., &
Treasury 8 (July 25, 2011), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/98-2719-IFR.pdf.
241
Harmon, supra note 204, at 452, 453-54 (critiquing the federal external review regulation
that allows plans governed by the federal external review process to select among at least three
contracted IROs for external review, whereas state external review laws prohibit IRO selection by
the plan, individual, or insurance issuer).
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guidance, but the underlying principles for enforcement have been
formulated in sub-regulatory guidance. The NQTL comparability
standards rely on the interpretive approach adopted under other civil
rights statutes that also apply a comparability standard to evaluate
discrimination in health benefits as well as health care and benefit design
practices.
A.

“SCOPE OF SERVICES” STANDARD UNDER THE PARITY ACT

The statutory right of health plans to exclude coverage altogether
for mental health or substance use disorder benefits raises the related
questions of (1) whether a plan that covers these benefits may restrict the
services that are offered, and if so, (2) the standard for evaluating
whether such a restriction complies with the Parity Act. The answer is
key to whether an individual with an addiction problem will have access
to a full continuum of services that may be needed to treat his or her
condition, equivalent to the services a person who is receiving cardiac
care may access—including medications, outpatient counseling of
varying degrees of intensity, inpatient hospital care, and residential
rehabilitation—or a bare minimum of treatment that the plan is given
total discretion to define. 242 Although the Parity Act’s language,
legislative history, and certain regulatory standards would indicate this is
a closed question, the regulatory agencies assert otherwise. The
agencies’ IFR preamble explains that the regulation does not address the
scope of services, even though it acknowledges that the law itself
prohibits health plans from imposing treatment limitations on mental
health and substance use disorder benefits that are more restrictive than
those applied to medical benefits. 243
Resolution of this issue is a linchpin to achieving equity and
therefore merits a detailed analysis of the Parity Act’s legislative history
and regulations to inform further agency action and judicial review. The
interplay of three portions of the statute—the definitions of key terms,
the non-discrimination standard for treatment limitations, and the
authority of a plan to exclude mental health or substance use disorder
benefits—must be examined by a court addressing this question.

242

See, e.g., Parity Implementation Coal. to EBSA Supervisory Benefit Advisor, U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, Atlanta, Ga. (June 23, 2011) (complaint against Coca-Cola Bottling Co. United) (on file
with author); Parity Implementation Coal. to EBSA Supervisory Benefit Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Fort Wright, Ky. (June 23, 2011) (complaint against Papa John’s Int’l, Inc.) (on file with
author).
243
Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75
Fed. Reg. 5410, 5416 (Feb. 2, 2010). The Departments invited comments on whether and to what
extent the parity law addresses the scope of services or continuum of care provided. Id. at 5416-17.
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“Benefits” Are Services

The first question is whether mental health and substance use
disorder “benefits”—the term used in the law—encompasses “services”
themselves. The statutory definitions of “medical or surgical benefits,”
“mental health or substance use disorder benefits,” and “substance use
disorder benefits” support a conclusion that “benefits” are the “services”
that will be covered and reimbursed. Each of these terms is defined as
“benefits with respect to services.” The term “medical or surgical
benefits” is defined with a singular focus on services: “benefits with
respect to medical or surgical services, as defined under the terms of the
plan or coverage . . . .” 244 Mental health or substance use disorder
benefits are defined as “benefits with respect to services for mental
health conditions [or substance use disorders], as defined under the terms
of the plan and in accordance with applicable Federal and State law.” 245
Thus, a “benefit”—regardless of whether medical, surgical, mental
health, or substance use disorder treatment—cannot be construed as
anything but the “services” (or therapeutic interventions) themselves. 246
This construction is consistent with the Parity Act’s legislative history 247
and the widely accepted construction of the term “benefit” in health care
law. 248
A second statutory standard that informs the meaning of “benefit”—
again confirming that Congress had “services” in mind when using this
term—is the Parity Act’s definition of “treatment limitations.” 249 As
described in Part II, the Parity Act provides that “treatment limitations
applicable to such mental health or substance use disorder benefits” may
be no more restrictive than or separate from the treatment limitations

244

29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(e)(3) (Westlaw 2012).
Id. § 1185a(e)(4), (5).
246
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 121, at 5 n.10 (“Benefits are
provisions or services included in a health insurance plan’s coverage.”).
247
The House-passed parity bill, H.R. 1424, set out five categories of care to which treatment
limitations and financial requirements are applied, which are now identified through regulation in the
six classifications. Each of those categories is described as covering the “items and services”
provided on either an outpatient, inpatient, or emergency care basis. See H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. §§
102(a), 103(a), 104(a) (2008). The Senate-passed bill defined “mental health benefits” as “benefits
with respect to mental health services (including substance use disorder treatment).” S. 558, 110th
Cong. § 2 (2007) (amending section 712A(f) of ERISA).
248
The Institute of Medicine’s study of the essential health benefit defined “covered benefits”
as “[t]he medical care items or services obtained by a subscriber that a health insurance plan agrees
to pay for, under certain terms and limitations.” INST. OF MED., supra note 123, at 26 (emphasis
added).
249
“The term ‘treatment limitation’ includes limits on the frequency of treatment, number of
visits, days of coverage, or other similar limitations on the scope or duration of treatment.” 29
U.S.C.A. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(iii) (Westlaw 2012).
245
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applied to medical benefits. Treatment limitations would have no
purpose in the statute if the frequency, days, or number of visits of
treatment applied to the “benefit” did not relate to services themselves.
The definition of this term also confirms that Congress intended to
regulate the “scope” of treatment services as a “treatment limitation,”
because it defines that term to explicitly include “other similar limits on
the scope or duration of treatment.” 250
2.

Plan Authority To Limit “Scope of Services”

The second critical question relates to whether the health plan can
limit the “scope of services” in any way. The definition of “medical or
surgical benefits” indicates that the plan itself defines the services to be
covered for all non-mental health and substance use disorders. The same
discretion, however, does not extend to mental health and substance use
disorders. Instead, the Act’s non-discrimination standard defines the
limitations that may be imposed on mental health or substance use
disorder services. To place that determination in the hands of the plan
without any limitations would amount to the pre-Act status quo. On the
other hand, to assert that a plan cannot limit the services for mental
health or addiction care in any way would arguably afford broader care
coverage than the plan extends to other medical conditions. Congress
struck a balance with the non-discrimination standard: it gave the health
plan full discretion to shape its medical services and then restricted its
choices for mental health or substance use disorder services to those that
are “no more restrictive than” or “separate” from standards for the
medical benefit. 251
Insurance carriers reject this formulation, contending that the broad
statutory authority to exclude coverage for all mental health or substance
use disorder benefits means that their choice on scope of treatment
services is also unconstrained. In other words, the greater power
includes the lesser power to selectively cover services. Plans rely on
Congress’s rejection of the House-passed bill’s provision that would
have required coverage of all conditions listed in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 252 as further evidence of
congressional support for full discretion in identifying the scope of
services. The definition of the mental health and substance use disorder
benefits also cedes some authority to the carriers, insofar as it states that
“services for mental health conditions [or substance use disorders], [are]
250

Id. (emphasis added).
See id. § 1185a(b).
252
See discussion supra accompanying notes 115-118.
251
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as defined under the terms of the plan and in accordance with applicable
Federal and State law.” 253 Finally, plans also narrowly construe the
“scope of” treatment language in the “treatment limitation” definition,
interpreting “other similar limits” to mean other numerical limitations on
scope of treatment rather than other criteria that limit the continuum of
care. 254 Thus, plans contend that their choice is limited only by state
laws that mandate the coverage of certain behavioral health services and
conditions and applicable federal law, which arguably excludes the
Parity Act for these purposes to avoid a tautology.
Several statutory standards cast significant doubt on this narrow
interpretation. First, a close reading of the definition of the terms
“mental health” and “substance use disorder benefits” demonstrates that
the phrase “as defined by the terms of the plan” modifies the word
“conditions” or “disorders” that may be covered, not the word
“services.” 255 This is consistent with the Parity Act provision that allows
health plans full discretion to define the medical conditions, if any, that
are covered. Second, the law’s construction provision identifies the
constraints that exist on plans that offer mental health and substance use
disorder benefits: it states that plans may set any “terms and conditions
of . . . coverage” as long as the terms conform to the non-discrimination
standard established by the Parity Act. 256 Any limitation on the “scope
253

29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(e)(4), (5) (Westlaw 2012) (emphasis added).
Although the term “similar” could be read to reach only those unlisted features that are
“quantifiable” in nature, the term “scope,” unlike “duration,” is not amenable to numerical
limitations.
255
The importance of this distinction becomes clear after examining the definition of mental
health and substance use disorder benefits in both the House- and Senate-passed bills. The definition
in the Senate-passed bill did not include the word “conditions” and would be construed correctly to
give plans discretion to identify the services to be covered, except as defined in state law. S. 558,
110th Cong. §§ 712A, 2705A (2007) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ means benefits with
respect to mental health services (including substance use disorder treatment) as defined under the
terms of the group health plan or coverage, and when applicable as may be defined under State
law . . . .”). The Senate Report interpreted this provision to mean that “the bill would not . . . require
that those plans cover all types of mental health services or ailments if the plan covered any mental
health services or ailments. Laws in some States, however, require that plans cover those
benefits . . . .” S. REP. NO. 110-53, at 7 (2007). The Parity Act, however, adopted the House-passed
bill definitions of mental health and substance use disorder benefits, with minor modifications.
Those definitions made clear that the word “conditions” and “disorders,” as opposed to “services,”
were modified by the phrase “as defined under the terms of the plan.” H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. §
102(b)(4), (5) (2007). (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ mean[s] benefits with respect to services
for mental health conditions, as defined under the terms of the plan and in accordance with
applicable law, but does not include substance-related disorder benefits. . . . The term ‘substancerelated disorder benefits’ means benefits with respect to services for substance-related disorders, as
defined under the terms of the plan and in accordance with law.”).
256
29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(b)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed . . .
(2) in the case of a group health plan . . . that provides mental health or substance use disorder
benefits, as affecting the terms and conditions of the plan or coverage relating to such benefits under
254
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of service” is certainly a term or condition of coverage, and it is either
permitted or disallowed, depending upon whether it is more restrictive
than the standard applied to substantially all medical benefits.
A restrictive interpretation of “scope of services” is also at odds
with several standards the IFR establishes to determine parity
compliance. First, the IFR provides six categories of services that serve
as the basis for comparisons between medical benefits and mental health
and substance use disorder services. By so doing, the IFR implicitly
establishes a “scope of services,” requiring, for example, the provision of
outpatient, inpatient, and emergency care, and prescription drugs
whenever any mental health or addiction benefit is provided in any one
of these classifications so long as a medical benefit is provided in the
classification. “Cross-classification” parity is required, according to the
regulating agencies, because the failure to offer an addiction benefit in
the same categories in which medical care is provided is “a limit . . . on
the type of setting or context in which treatment is offered.”257 The same
must be true if medical services of a particular type or intensity are
offered within a classification but comparable addiction services are not;
i.e., the type of care is limited, not just the setting or context.
Second, the IFR explicitly addresses “a variety of limits [imposed
by plans] affecting the scope and duration of benefits under the plan that
are not expressed numerically” 258 by barring discrimination in the use of
non-quantitative treatment limitations. Restrictions on the scope of
addiction services amount to an NQTL. In other words, a plan
implements a rule that disallows certain services required to treat a
person’s opiate addiction, while not limiting the continuum of services
required to treat a patient’s heart disease. 259 If the law authorizes the
regulation of a wide range of plan design features (medical management,
provider network design and reimbursement rates, and prescription drug
formularies) because they affect the “scope” of benefits, then certainly
any plan feature that directly limits the scope of services to one type of
care for a condition should be within the law’s purview. Members of
Congress have noted their disapproval of the IFR’s failure to address the
scope-of-services standard, informing the regulatory agencies that the
Parity Act was intended to require equity in the scope of services offered

the plan or coverage, except as provided in subsection (a).”). The internal reference to the parity law
standard in the construction provision makes it unnecessary to determine whether the reference to
“federal law” in the definition of mental health and substance use disorder also encompasses the
parity law.
257
Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75
Fed. Reg. 5410, 5413 (Feb. 2, 2010).
258
Id. at 5416.
259
See Letter from Patton Boggs LLP to Parity Implementation Coal. 4-5 (Mar. 26, 2010).
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as long as a mental health or substance use disorder condition is
covered. 260
3.

Clinical Practice Standards Related to “Scope of Services”

To the extent a plan’s restriction on the scope of services is deemed
to be an NQTL that is not applied to medical benefits, that restriction is
only permitted if “recognized clinically appropriate standards of care . . .
permit a difference.” 261 Plans would be hard-pressed to meet that
standard in light of current clinical practice standards for addiction
treatment. For example, the National Quality Forum (NQF), a nonprofit
organization that develops national consensus standards to improve the
quality of healthcare, has identified evidence-based standards for
substance use disorder treatment that include a full continuum of care
from identification of a substance use problem by a general health
practitioner to treatment for substance use illness in general medical,
mental health, and specialty settings. 262 Appropriate treatment services
include withdrawal management, psychosocial treatment in inpatient and
outpatient settings as well as mental health and general medical settings,
pharmacotherapy linked with psychosocial treatment, and continuing
care management. 263 The NQF standards also state that an appropriate
“dose” of treatment is required for treatment effectiveness and relies on
research to suggest that most patients require about three months of
treatment to reach a threshold of significant improvement and then
additional care or support for sustained recovery. 264
260

Letter from Paul D. Tonko, Member of Congress, et al. to Hilda Solis, U.S. Labor Sec’y,
Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, and Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Health & Human Servs. Sec’y
(May 18, 2011) (“Let us be unequivocal—while the MPHAEA was never intended to be a mandate
for coverage of specific mental health conditions or addictive disorders—once a plan has chosen to
provide coverage for a specific mental health or substance use disorder, the basic framework of the
law is to equalize behavioral and medical benefits and end the discrimination that has for so long
limited access to behavioral benefits, as compared to the medical benefits covered by plans. Plan
participant and beneficiary access to a similar scope of services and continuum of care on the
behavioral health side as is provided on the medical side was clearly an integral part of the
MHPAEA.”) (on file with author); see also Al Franken, U.S. Senator, et al. to Hilda Solis, U.S.
Labor Sec’y, Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, and Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Health & Human
Servs. Sec’y (May 12, 2011) (“The regulations themselves confer a scope of service by requiring
that plans cover a minimum of six types of services.”) (on file with author).
261
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(c)(4)(i) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i) (Westlaw
2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(4)(i) (Westlaw 2013).
262
NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, NAT’L VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS FOR THE
TREATMENT OF SUBSTANCE USE CONDITIONS: EVIDENCE-BASED TREATMENT PRACTICES 14-24
(2007).
263
Id.
264
Id. at 18-19 (citing NIDA, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A RESEARCHBASED GUIDE (1999)).
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The American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) has
developed a national standard—used by over thirty states 265 —to evaluate
the appropriate level of care for patients with substance use disorders and
to assist care providers and managed care companies in establishing care
standards. The ASAM Patient Placement Criteria identify five different
levels of addiction treatment that a patient may require, depending upon
the severity of her or his condition: early intervention, outpatient
services, intensive outpatient/partial hospitalization, residential/inpatient
(including four different levels of non-hospital residential care), and
medically managed intensive inpatient services. 266 The specialty care
settings in which services are provided across this continuum are often
accredited by the Joint Commission and the Commission on
Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities (CARF) 267 —the national
accrediting bodies that accredit medical and surgical facilities.
Nationally recognized care guidelines, the Milliman Care
Guidelines, 268 like the ASAM criteria, also provide for a full continuum
of behavioral health services based on best practices in the medical and
scientific literature. According to a Milliman analysis of the behavioral
health services required to treat depression and alcoholism, care must be
available across five levels of care to appropriately address the severity

265

The ASAM Patient Placement Criteria, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., 2-4 (2001)
(referencing Levels 0.5, I, II, III, and IV). Maryland, for example, requires addiction treatment
programs to adhere to ASAM Placement Criteria when making treatment decisions, including care
funded under grant funds and Medicaid.
MD. CODE REGS. 10.09.67.10(A)(1)(b),
10.47.10.04(A)(2)(a) (Westlaw 2012).
266
ASAM PATIENT PLACEMENT CRITERIA FOR THE TREATMENT OF SUBSTANCE-RELATED
DISORDERS 27-33 (David Mee-Lee ed., 2d ed. 2001).
267
CARF, for example, accredits programs that provide medical rehabilitation for conditions
such as brain trauma, stroke, cardiac rehabilitation, amputation, and physical injury that parallel the
types of programs and services that are required for substance use disorder rehabilitation. Letter
from Nikki Migas, Comm’n on Accreditation of Rehab. Facilities Int’l to Dep’t of Labor, Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Office of Disability, Aging, and Long-Term Care Policy, and
Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin. (Nov. 3, 2010) (on file with author). Each set of
conditions may require a period of acute hospitalization followed by a period of residential
rehabilitation, periodic services on an outpatient basis, and home and community services. Id.
268
The Milliman Care Guidelines are developed to assist clinicians in making evidence-based
care decisions in a range of healthcare settings, including hospital, acute and subacute medical and
rehabilitation, skilled nursing, home healthcare, and ambulatory facilities. See Letter from Stephen
P. Melek, Milliman Consulting Actuary, to Carol McDaid, Principal, Capital Decisions, Inc. 3-4
(Dec. 7, 2010). The Guidelines identify a range of “demonstrated best practices” and seek to reduce
unnecessary and pervasive variation in medical practice. Id. at 4. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid and some of the largest health plans in the United States use the Milliman Care Guidelines
to support their utilization and quality review. Id. (stating that “the Parity Implementation Coalition
asked us to conduct an analysis of the scope and range of services between common Medical and
Behavioral disorders”).
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of the patient’s condition and recovery progress. 269 Those levels of
care—acute inpatient hospital care; subacute inpatient care including
rehabilitation hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and other facilities like
residential treatment programs; intensive outpatient services; home
health services; and routine outpatient care 270 —are analogous to the
levels of care required for the treatment of common medical conditions.
Milliman compared the Care Guidelines for services required to
treat diabetes and myocardial infarction with coronary artery disease
with those required for alcoholism and depression, respectively, and
concluded that the “levels of care and settings for treatment were similar
and analogous” and that “many of the clinical criteria, such as judgments
about the acuity and severity of the illness, were similar for both medical
Based on its review, Milliman
and behavioral conditions.” 271
discourages “differences in the availability of a continuum of care
alternatives between common medical and common behavioral
conditions” and advises that “access to a complete continuum of
evidence-based care alternatives is vital for achieving best practices in
care delivery.” 272
Thus, a fair reading of the legal standards and application of clinical
practice guidelines suggest that health plans that restrict the continuum of
services for mental health or substance use disorder care while providing
a full spectrum of service levels to treat medical conditions violate the
Parity Act. This is not to suggest that the specific healthcare services
required to treat a person with alcoholism will be the same as those
required to treat a person with diabetes—those services are unique to the
underlying condition just as they would be unique if one were comparing
care for two different “medical” illnesses, such as diabetes and
asthma. 273 But if a plan covers acute hospital and subacute residential
services in its inpatient classification for common medical conditions, it
must do the same for a substance use disorder once the plan includes that
condition. 274
269

This analysis, performed at the request of the Parity Implementation Coalition to respond
to the IFR request for information on the scope of service issue, compared the scope and range of
services under the Milliman Care Guidelines for three common behavioral health disorders with
three medical disorders. Letter from Stephen P. Melek, supra note 268, at 1.
270
Id.
271
Id. at 2.
272
Id. at 2-3.
273
Id. at 2.
274
This construction of the Parity Act’s scope of services standard conforms with the Title
VII gender discrimination standard for health insurance coverage, as set out in Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983) (holding that health insurance
benefits for pregnancy-related conditions that provide more comprehensive services for female
employees than for the wives of male employees violate Title VII). The Title VII standard has been
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A recent HHS analysis of scope of services seems to reflect a
greater concern about whether a robust scope-of-services requirement
would deviate from current employer-based plan coverage (and thereby
impose significant additional plan costs) than about whether the legal
authority exists to require parity for scope of services. Research, in fact,
reveals that employer health plans in 2008 (pre-parity) covered
“intermediate” levels of care for mental health/substance use disorders
(those lying between inpatient and outpatient) to significant, but varying,
degrees. Virtually all employer plans (98%) had claims for intensive
outpatient treatment; over half (59%) had claims for partial
hospitalization; and one fifth (18%) had claims for non-hospital
residential treatment. 275 The additional cost to the plan of providing
these three services represented a “very small fraction of the average
total plan cost.” 276 Thus, statutory interpretation, clinical practice, and
cost considerations support a determination that a plan’s scope of
services for behavioral health services must be comparable to medical
services.
B.

NON-QUANTITATIVE TREATMENT LIMITATIONS: IMPLEMENTING
THE COMPARABILITY STANDARD

The IFR standard for non-quantitative treatment limitations offers
limited guidance for enforcement of this important and far-reaching
standard. The regulatory agencies have begun to fill the gap with
workable standards, but they must be placed in final regulations to
eliminate confusion about the standard and ensure consistent application.
The emerging compliance test is based on the principle that plan
administrators are barred from managing mental health/substance use

delineated most extensively in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) benefits context in which
the EEOC looks to comparable non-pregnancy related medical service categories and compares the
scope of services available for pregnancy care. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1604, App. (Westlaw 2013)
(Questions 3, 21-29 and Answers). EEOC guidance, for example, evaluates the legality of a policy’s
exclusion of routine sonograms during the course of pregnancy by comparing it to the policy’s
coverage of other routine diagnostic procedures. If the employer’s policy covers routine dental xrays or PAP smears, the EEOC has concluded that it must cover sonograms to a comparable extent.
EEOC, supra note 133. Similarly, the EEOC has advised that a plan must cover the cost of a private
hospital room for pregnancy-related conditions if it does so for other medical conditions; it must also
cover the cost of pre- and post-natal office visits if it covers office visits to physicians for other
medical conditions. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1604, App. (Question 25). This same analytical approach should
apply under the Parity Act and regulations to effectuate the explicit policy of ensuring that
behavioral health benefits are not distinguished from medical/surgical benefits. See Interim Final
Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5415 (Feb.
2, 2010).
275
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 233, at 30.
276
Id. ($2.40 per member per month, or 0.9%).
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disorder services differently from medical services unless a clinical
justification exists. As described below, plan administrators must follow
a three-step process to demonstrate that the underlying factors the plan
uses to apply NQTLs are comparable and, thus, parity compliant.
As described in Part II.B, the IFR defines NQTLs as a type of
“treatment limitation” 277 but adopts a standard that requires a comparison
of the underlying NQTL “processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or
other factors” both as written and as applied to behavioral health and
medical services in the particular classification. This standard fits within
a classic equality framework in which the NQTL standards for the
“protected class”—mental health and substance use disorder benefits—
are compared to the NQTL standards of the control group—medical
benefits in the same classification.
The NQTL standard poses implementation challenges for at least
two interrelated reasons. 278 First, the term “comparable” is not defined
in the regulations. 279 In other discrimination contexts, the term
“comparable” means “similar to” 280 or possessing “important common

277

Some legal interpretations assert that the “substantially all” and “predominant” standards
also apply to NQTLs specifically because they are a form of treatment limitations. See Letter from
Patton Boggs LLP to Parity Implementation Coal. 10-13 (Mar. 26, 2010) (on file with author).
Under this interpretation, an NQTL must first satisfy the “substantially all” standard of applying to
two thirds of the medical benefits. Id. at 10. The “comparable to/applied no more stringently”
standard is then applied as the measure of whether an NQTL is “more restrictive” than the standard
applied to medical benefits, since there is no quantitative measure to evaluate the degree of
restrictiveness. Id. at 11. This analysis concedes that the language and structure of the IFR do not
necessarily support this interpretation. Id. at 12. Although DOL’s November 2011 sub-regulatory
guidance construes the validity of NQTLs through the treatment limitation framework of barring
“separate” or “more restrictive” standards, it makes clear that an arithmetic test does not apply to the
NQTL parity analysis. FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part VII and Mental
Health Parity Implementation, supra note 133.
278
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 121, at 18-19 (noting that the IFR does
not specify steps employers can use to comply with the NQTL standards and that the “comparable”
and “no more stringently” terms may be interpreted and applied inconsistently, which MBHOs have
acknowledged they are doing).
279
The Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of “comparable” is “capable of or suitable for
comparison.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 252 (11th ed. 2007). This provides
a qualitative standard that offers limited guidance for purposes of implementation in the Parity Act
context, because the comparator is the full range of medical benefits.
280
For example, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act affords a pregnant woman a comparative
right to workplace accommodations that is defined by the standards set for all other employees with
a similar capacity to work. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (Westlaw 2012) (“[W]omen affected by
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .” (emphasis added)). For a discussion of
this standard, see Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98
GEO. L.J. 567, 613-15 (2010). In addition, some state Equal Pay Act provisions establish a standard
that looks to whether the work is of a “comparable” character. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg,
Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17, 46-47 (2010) (explaining that
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characteristics,” 281 and the identification of a comparison group or one
member of the comparison group who is afforded more favorable
treatment would render the challenged practice invalid. Disputes may
exist over whether one comparator is more closely aligned with the
protected group than another comparator, 282 but a fairly well-defined and
limited range of choices generally exists, 283 and a careful analysis of the
facts will allow a determination of which comparator is most like the
protected group. 284
In the parity context, however, the regulations identify the
appropriate comparator as “medical/surgical benefits,” a category that
encompasses a wide range of services for hundreds of conditions. Health
plans may identify a single medical service in the classification that is
subject to the same NQTL as behavioral health services, thereby
justifying the standard, regardless of the number of medical services for
which no such requirement exists. Or, as the industry has asserted,
certain behavioral health services have no analogue in medical care, and
thus no comparison can be made. With limited guidance in the IFR as to
what is sufficient for comparison purposes, a court would have to
exercise considerable discretion in resolving the dispute. 285
Oregon’s standard of “work of comparable character” has been interpreted to mean a job
“substantially similar” to that performed by male supervisors). My thanks to Professor Deborah
Eisenberg for directing my analysis to these sets of standards.
281
Bureau of Labor & Indus. v. City of Roseburg, 706 P.2d 956, 959 n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
282
In the Fair Housing Act context, for example, a group recovery home for persons with
histories of alcoholism or drug dependence that challenges a restrictive zoning or fire safety standard
must often demonstrate its similarity to one land use classification (a single family dwelling) as
opposed to another (a rooming or boarding house), based on the functional relationship of the
residents and the dwelling. See, e.g., Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 284
(D. Conn. 2001) (finding that a group recovery home is a single-family house for purposes of
zoning, not a lodging or boarding house), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003).
283
For example, in a pending discrimination case related to zoning standards for residential
drug treatment programs, in which I am counsel, the parties narrowed the comparators to single and
multiple family dwellings, hospitals, nursing homes, and community correctional facilities, but
disagreed on the “right” comparator. The court adopted the comparator that the City defendant had
asserted, without explaining the basis of its decision. See United States v. City of Balt., 845 F. Supp.
2d 640, 650 (D. Md. 2012). In the pregnancy discrimination context, some commentators have
observed that “comparators” are, in fact, difficult to identify, undermining the ability to demonstrate
that an employer’s failure to accommodate a pregnant woman’s request for job modifications
deviates from accommodations afforded non-pregnant employees. See Grossman, supra note 280, at
614-15.
284
See, e.g., Hovsons, Inc. v. Twp. of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1104-05 (3d Cir. 1996)
(comparing zoning standards for a nursing home with those for a residential retirement community,
both of which cater to elderly people); Smith Berch, Inc. v. Balt. Cnty., 115 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523-24
(D. Md. 2000) (comparing zoning standards for methadone treatment program with those of other
medical clinics and treatment programs).
285
Courts may also gloss over the exact parameters of the comparable medical standard. One
commentator has critiqued the court’s decision in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d
1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001), which invalidated the exclusion of prescription contraceptives based on
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Second, and closely related, the medical services across the
spectrum of those “medical/surgical benefits” are condition-specific,
rendering them difficult to compare or evaluate on a “stringency”
scale. 286 Insurance carriers and MBHOs have complained that it is
impossible to conduct an “apples-to-apples” comparison, considering the
wide variation in the benefits themselves. 287 Although NQTLs are best
thought of as generalizable standards that functionally affect access to
care—as opposed to the medical guidelines for treating a particular
condition—the IFRs “safe harbor” standard lends credence to the
suggestion that “clinical standards of care” for particular conditions may
be a part of this analysis. 288 These concerns suggest the more
fundamental question of whether a discrimination framework—and
particularly one that focuses on disparate treatment—is even the right
paradigm.
Sub-regulatory guidance suggests that a micro-level inquiry or a
“mapping” of medical benefits onto behavioral health benefits is neither
the right starting point nor the appropriate focus of the equity analysis.
Instead, the regulatory agencies set out a three-step process that first
requires the plan to identify the underlying “factors” that govern the plan
the lack of comprehensive coverage of women’s prescription drugs compared with the formulary for
men, for failing to identify the comparable drugs that were covered for men. Hoffman, supra note
25, at 1351.
286
Thus, in contrast to the “scope of services” issue where the same levels of services are
generally required to provide appropriate care for both medical and addiction/mental health
disorders, once one goes beyond the framework of those levels of care, the individual services will
differ depending upon the medical condition, whether that is a somatic condition or a mental
health/substance use condition.
287
See supra note 166 (plaintiff’s complaint in Coalition for Parity, Inc. v. Sebelius alleged
that “medical and behavioral health benefits cannot be compared on an ‘apples to apples’ basis”).
The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), which set standards for and accredits
health plans, has observed that there is no practical way to compare whether a single coverage
decision is arrived at in a manner that is more restrictive than a corresponding medical
determination. Letter from Margaret E. O’Kane, President, Nat’l Comm. for Quality Assurance, to
Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Health & Human Servs. Sec’y, Hilda Solis, U.S. Labor Sec’y, and Timothy
Geithner, U.S. Treasury Sec’y (May 3, 2010), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB305314.pdf. As an alternative to the IFR standard, the NCQA recommends that the safe harbor be
extended to protect plans that meet certain procedural guidelines, which, according to NCQA, would
ensure that NQTLs are applied in an evidence-based manner rather than in a way to limit mental
health and substance use disorder care. Among those procedural safeguards are a documented
utilization review process that is administered by mental health practitioners; coverage decisions that
are objective, based on clinical evidence and applied consistently; and decisions that are rendered in
a timely manner with a right to appeal. Id. This formulation does not, however, add anything to the
procedural standards that should already govern medical management practices.
288
The IFR preamble acknowledged that condition-level considerations are implicated in the
comparability standard, noting that different types of injuries or illnesses may require different
review and different care. Interim Final Rules Under Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act
of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5416 (Feb. 2, 2010) (“The acute versus chronic nature of a condition,
the complexity of it or the treatment involved, and other factors may affect the review.”).
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administrator’s decisionmaking when applying an NQTL across all
health benefits (both behavioral and medical benefits). 289 Identification
of the processes by which those factors have been developed is also
relevant to the determination of whether the comparability requirement
has been satisfied. 290 Second, the underlying factors that apply to
behavioral health benefits and the processes used to arrive at those
factors must be compared for evidence of “arbitrary or discriminatory
differences.” 291 Third, the plan must justify any variation in the
standards for mental health/substance use disorders by documenting its
reliance on a clinically appropriate standard of care. 292 Just as an
employer must identify the essential functions of a job to facilitate a fair
evaluation of whether an individual with a disability is qualified for or
has been unlawfully rejected from the position, 293 so must an employer’s
health plan administrator “document[] its analysis that its NQTL
processes and strategies . . . are comparable across medical/surgical and
mental health/substance use disorder benefits.” 294
The regulatory agencies have identified relevant industry-based
factors that plans may use in designing their NQTLs and the framework
for a fair rule-setting process. 295 Generally, plans should adopt their
“rules” through a review of the medical literature, professional standards
and protocols, and other empirical data that may be specific to the
289

This analysis is most clearly set out in the DOL’s Self-Compliance Tool for Part 7 of
ERISA. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 173, at 27-29.
290
For example, an HHS analysis of the comparability standard as applied to medical
necessity criteria focused on whether the process for establishing and updating the criteria for mental
health/substance use disorder benefits and medical benefits was comparable as well as the medical
necessity criteria themselves. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 233, at 9-10.
291
See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 173, at 28.
292
Id. at 28-29 (explaining that a plan’s decision to cover neuropsychological testing for only
certain behavioral health conditions must be based on documented criteria and evidence supporting
its decision, and the requirement that behavioral health providers have supervised clinical training to
participate in network is permissible even if a similar requirement does not exist for medical
practitioners, because the latter professionals satisfy supervised clinical training requirement as a
degree requirement). As an additional example, an HHS analysis concluded that a “stepped care
requirement” that routinely requires a person with substance use disorder to participate in outpatient
treatment before being authorized for inpatient or residential treatment would be inequitable because
such requirements are not applied routinely to general medical conditions. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 233, at 11.
293
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), (n)(3)(ii) (Westlaw 2013) (defining “qualified” as an
individual who meets the job-related requirements and can perform the essential functions of the
position, with or without reasonable accommodations; and evidence of whether particular function is
“essential” to include “written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job”).
294
See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 173, at 28.
295
The regulatory agencies relied on an industry and expert consultation process to develop
these standards. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 233, at 4, 9 (explaining
the process).
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plan. 296 Reliance on evidence-based resources should prevent selection
of arbitrary or discriminatory standards. Factors that may be taken into
consideration when deciding whether to apply an NQTL include the cost
of treatment, high-cost growth, variability in cost and quality, elasticity
of demand, provider discretion in determining diagnosis or type or length
of treatment, clinical efficacy of proposed treatment, licensing and
accreditation of providers, and types of claims with a high percentage of
fraud. 297 Many of these considerations reflect MBHO justifications for
applying different standards for the management of behavioral health
benefits, such as variations in provider training and credentialing,
diagnostic uncertainty, variability in duration of treatment, and costcontainment. 298 But, as medical experts have pointed out, this variability
and uncertainty exist in the treatment of certain medical conditions, 299
and thus plans must show that these factors are considered when
determining the management features for medical benefits as well. 300
The Parity Act is not violated as long as plan administrators apply the
relevant factors across both medical and behavioral health benefits in
determining which NQTL standard to apply and do not apply the specific
NQTL more stringently to behavioral health conditions.
The regulatory agencies have also addressed (at least partially) the
concerns of parity advocates that a numerical threshold is needed to
demonstrate equality for each NQTL, as with quantifiable treatment
limitations and financial requirements. They have built in a rough
qualitative check as a proxy for a bright-line standard; the NQTL must
apply in a differentiated fashion to both behavioral health and medical
benefits. A standard that applies to all mental health/substance use

296

See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 233, at 9; FAQs About
Affordable Care Act Implementation Part VII and Mental Health Parity Implementation, supra note
133 (approving a plan’s medical management techniques that were based, in part, on a “wide array
of recognized medical literature and professional standards and protocols”).
297
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 173, at 27; FAQs About Affordable Care Act
Implementation Part VII and Mental Health Parity Implementation, supra note 133.
298
See discussion supra accompanying notes 61-69.
299
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 233, at 13-14 (explaining that
(1) certain medical care procedures are characterized by clinical uncertainty and practice variability,
such as physical therapy; (2) certain medical conditions, such as lower back pain, are subject to
diagnostic uncertainty and high variability in treatment/provider choice; and (3) practitioners in
certain areas of medical care have different levels of medical training, such as surgeons and
podiatrists, who provide foot care; physicians, anesthesiologists, and acupuncturists, who do pain
management; and physiatrists, physical therapists, and occupational therapists, who work in physical
medicine).
300
For example, a preauthorization requirement for Suboxone, which is used to treat opiate
dependence, would be appropriate if justified by clinical considerations, such as risk for abuse. But
the same criteria must also be applied to other medications that have a risk of abuse, such as
Oxycontin. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 233, at 14.
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disorder benefits, but just a few medical benefits, would presumably
mean that the plan’s standards are not being applied equally across the
plan’s benefits. 301 This means that a plan’s NQTL standard will not
evade scrutiny just because the standard also applies to a small number
of medical conditions. In addition, a plan will be barred from defining
equity by the lowest common denominator, a limitation identified in
other discrimination contexts. 302
The NQTL analytical framework responds appropriately to carrier
and MBHO concerns that more restrictive benefit management for
behavioral health is needed to ensure appropriate and high quality care,
that a comparability standard is unworkable because of the inherent
differences between behavioral health and general medical care, and that
the IFR’s regulation of all plan management features exceeds statutory
authority. Clearly, the IFR, in keeping with the Parity Act, permits plans
to continue to manage their behavioral health benefits and, in fact, take
into consideration cost factors that have been the primary impetus for
restrictive standards. Quality considerations are not sacrificed so long as
a clinical justification exists for a requirement that regulates a behavioral
health provider differently than a medical care provider. And finally, the
NQTL framework does not contemplate a one-to-one comparison of
behavioral health and medical care services themselves. Rather, it
compares the underlying “rules” that govern care delivery more
generally. Thus, it should not matter that one type of behavioral health
care does not have a perfect analogue in the medical care context—what
matters is whether the “rules” that set the standards for plan management
for all health services apply across the board regardless of the unique
services that may exist for either behavioral or medical care. A clinical
justification for a different plan management standard may be available
for services that are unique to either behavioral health or medical
conditions.
The remaining question that has fueled objections to the application
of parity standards to plan management features is whether plan costs
will skyrocket without unfettered behavioral health management
standards. Economic models that could predict the cost implications of
parity for NQTLs did not exist when the statute was enacted because the
301

See discussion supra accompanying notes 177-179.
Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, for example, which employs a comparative
standard for determining appropriate workplace accommodations, the Seventh Circuit wrote,
“Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant
employees . . . .” Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[U]nder the PDA, employers are not
required to give pregnant women special treatment; they must only treat them the same as all other
employees.”).
302
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original Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan (FEHPB) model did not
require parity in plan management, and FEHBP plans frequently
delivered behavioral health through carve-out arrangements to manage
utilization and cost. 303 A recent study of plan costs under Oregon’s
parity law, one of the few state parity laws that applies to NQTLs as well
as financial requirements and quantitative treatment limitations, 304 sheds
light on this question.
Like the Parity Act, the Oregon law allows plans to manage the
behavioral health benefit to control costs and utilization, but disallows
differential management of that benefit. In a comparison of the plan
costs for four commercial insurance plans in the two years preceding and
following the implementation of the Oregon parity law, plan spending
increased between $12 and $26 per person using behavioral health care,
but no spending increase was statistically significant. 305 The study
authors concluded, based on the Oregon data, that the effect of the
federal parity law on overall plan spending could be relatively small, in
large part because behavioral health expenditures are a small portion of
total plan spending, 306 and the services remain a managed benefit. 307
The remaining challenge from an implementation perspective is to
ensure that health plans comply with the parity standards on a consistent
basis. 308 Part IV identifies actions on the part of health plan certification
bodies, federal regulators, and state insurance departments that will
address front-end compliance.

303

See discussion supra accompanying notes 54-57; U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., FEHB
Program Carrier Letter, No. 2008-17 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at www.opm.gov/healthcareinsurance/healthcare/carriers/2008/2008-17.pdf (in announcing additional parity requirements
pursuant to the Parity Act, OPM noted that the FEHBP program had been able to expand access by
“using managed care programs to ensure access to appropriate provider networks and to keep cost
increases to a minimum”).
304
OR. REV. STAT. § 743A.168 (Westlaw 2012) (group health insurance policy providing
coverage for hospital or medical expenses “shall provide coverage for expenses arising from
treatment for chemical dependence, including alcoholism, and for mental or nervous conditions at
the same level as, and subject to limitations no more restrictive than, those imposed on coverage or
reimbursement of expenses arising from treatment for other medical conditions”; applying standard
to deductibles, coinsurance, treatment limitations, medical necessity determinations, and utilization
management).
305
K. John McConnell et al., Behavioral Health Insurance Parity: Does Oregon’s Experience
Presage the National Experience with the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act?, 169 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 31, 34 (2012) (reporting the average change in spending for adults after accounting
for secular trends; the change in spending for children was higher than adults, but the point estimate
of the effect of parity for all individuals across all four plans was $15).
306
Id. at 36.
307
Susan H. Busch, Implications of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, 169
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 2 (2012).
308
McConnell et al., supra note 305, at 33 (noting that across the four plans, “compliance and
interpretation of the parity law were inconsistent”).
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IV. STRATEGIES TO ENSURE PLAN COMPLIANCE WITH PARITY
REQUIREMENTS
The Parity Act, coupled with the extension of parity protections to
persons purchasing individual and small group coverage under the ACA,
will go a long way to remedy historical discrimination if enforced on
multiple levels. Federal regulators and state insurance commissioners,
along with the future Health Benefit Exchanges, 309 have the authority to
ensure front-end compliance with the Parity Act so that individuals with
mental health and substance use disorders need not be the front-line
enforcers. National accreditation bodies, such as URAC and the
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), have similar
authority regarding carriers that wish to sell group plans, and they play a
particularly important role for those entities selling qualified health plans
in Health Benefit Exchanges. 310 Given the long history of discriminatory
insurance standards, the complexity of the parity regulations, and the
plan’s control of information required to monitor compliance, it seems
most equitable to require a health plan to demonstrate compliance with
the Parity Act as a condition of a carrier’s accreditation or plan
certification. As described below, some regulatory entities have begun to
require this evidence, thereby demonstrating the feasibility of the
approach. The following modest recommendations will promote better
enforcement without imposing additional costs on group plans and
insurance issuers.
A.

PROMULGATION OF FINAL PARITY REGULATIONS

Federal regulators must promptly issue a final rule for employerbased group health plans and Medicaid managed care plans to end the
uncertainty regarding the Parity Act’s application to a plan’s scope of
services and to achieve more uniform implementation of the plan
management (NQTL) standards. The timing is critical because many
states are moving forward under the tight ACA implementation schedule
to establish certification standards for qualified health plans. The ACA

309

Sections 1311(b) and 1321(b) of the Affordable Care Act require each state to establish a
Health Benefit Exchange, which will be the marketplace for the sale of insurance to individuals and
small employers, or to participate in a federally established Exchange. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§
1311(b), 1321(b), 124 Stat. 119, 173, 186 (2010).
310
Section 1311(c)(1)(D)(i) of the Affordable Care Act requires a health plan issuer to be
“accredited with respect to local performance on clinical quality measures.” Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1311(c)(1)(D)(i), 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010). Recently promulgated regulations require qualified
health plan issuers to obtain accreditation from either URAC or the National Committee for Quality
Assurance (NCQA). 45 C.F.R. § 156.275(b)(1), (2)(i) (Westlaw 2013).
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requirement that qualified health plans include coverage of mental health
and addiction treatment in the Essential Health Benefits package will
protect against benefit exclusion in individual and small group plans and,
additionally, will require (separate from the parity requirement) some
level of proportionality with the scope of coverage for other required
essential health benefits. 311 The application of parity standards to all
qualified health plans and plans sold in the individual and small group
market makes it all the more important to have clearly articulated “scope
of services” and plan management standards in place. Both features
speak directly to the comprehensiveness and cost of the behavioral health
benefit, 312 and the parameters will determine whether the benefit is truly
non-discriminatory. 313
The adoption of several additional notification requirements in the
final rule would also assist consumers in understanding their rights under
the parity law. First, to supplement the required notification of a
carrier’s decision to implement a cost-based exemption from the Parity
Act, 314 the regulatory agencies should require plans to provide
“affirmative” notification that informs participants and beneficiaries of
their right to comparable coverage of mental health and substance use
disorder services. 315 The DOL should also require each plan to include
in its Summary Plan Description (SPD) 316 three items related to the
Parity Act: (1) an explanation of how the plan complies with the parity
requirements for financial requirements and treatment limitations; (2)
notice of the participant/beneficiary’s right to information about the
plan’s criteria for medical necessity determinations; and (3) notice that,
for denials of coverage based on medical necessity, the

311

Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(4)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 164 (2010) (requiring that the
“essential health benefits reflect an appropriate balance among categories . . . so that benefits are not
unduly weighted toward any category”). This standard offers some assurance that the scope of
benefits for mental health/substance use disorders will be proportional to medical benefits, even if
federal regulators conclude that the Parity Act itself does not require parity in the scope of services.
312
See INST. OF MED., supra note 123, at 80, 83 (noting that the two competing goals in
establishing the Essential Health Benefits are comprehensiveness and cost).
313
The ACA prohibits the states in crafting the Essential Health Benefits package from
making coverage decisions, determining reimbursement rates, or designing benefits in a way that
“discriminate against individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life.” Pub. L.
No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(4)(B), 124 Stat. 119, 164 (2010). Although this benefit discrimination
standard has not been fleshed out in regulations, it must, at a minimum, incorporate the parity
standards for mental health/substance use disorder benefits.
314
26 U.S.C.A. § 9812(c)(2)(E)(i) (Westlaw 2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(c)(2)(E)(i)
(Westlaw 2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26(c)(2)(E)(i) (Westlaw 2012).
315
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185(d) (Westlaw 2012) (requiring notification of restrictions on length
of hospitalization related to childbirth); id. § 1185b(b) (requiring written notice to inform plan
participants and beneficiaries of benefits for mastectomy-related health services).
316
29 U.S.C.A. § 1021(a) (Westlaw 2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (Westlaw 2012).
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participant/beneficiary has a right to access the medical necessity criteria
for both the behavioral health benefit at issue and the comparable
medical benefit. All three SPD explanations will help translate complex
standards into more enforceable rights. In addition, explicit SPD
requirements would provide some assurance that plans—particularly
those that are self-insured and not subject to oversight by state insurance
departments—are paying attention to parity requirements.
Finally, the dissemination of agency decisions on parity complaints
would expedite the development of a body of standards and begin to fill
in gaps in interpretation. As noted above, a substantial number of
complaints have been filed with the DOL, but no public record of the
resolution of those complaints exists. As with other areas of civil rights
enforcement, agency decisions can be an important source of guidance
for compliance and self-enforcement.
B.

NATIONAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS

Carriers generally obtain accreditation from national accrediting
bodies to demonstrate the quality of their health insurance products or
plans, and the accreditation process provides an ideal opportunity to
ensure that plans meet parity standards. One national accreditation body,
URAC, has included Parity Act compliance standards in its accreditation
protocols as of January 2012. The accreditation standards require an
organization to provide a written, detailed analysis for each health
benefit plan that demonstrates that it does not apply more restrictive
financial requirements or treatment limitations for mental health/
substance use disorder services. 317 If the plan applies a different
standard for behavioral health benefits, the URAC standards require the
organization to provide the medical or scientific evidence or clinical
practice guideline that justifies the standard. 318 Finally, the accreditation
standards require any issuer that contracts with another organization to
provide behavioral health benefits, such as a MBHO, to specify that the
contractor must comply with the Parity Act. 319 URAC compliance
approval is based on the plan’s demonstrated adherence to the designated
process and documentation of a reasoned analysis. The key limitation of

317

URAC, HEALTH PLAN ACCREDITATION PROGRAM, VERSION 7.0, at 338, 340 (2012) (PMHP 1—Analysis of Compliance with Mental Health Parity Law—and P-MHP 2 UM—Protocols
Applied to MH/SUD Benefits).
318
Id.
319
Id. at 342 (P-MHP 3—MH/SUD Parity Addressed in Contractor Written Agreements).
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the URAC accreditation standard is that the review body does not “pass
judgment” on whether the issuer’s representations are valid. 320
Although URAC accreditation cannot be relied upon as evidence of
parity compliance (since no evaluation of plan data is performed), the
URAC standard is nonetheless important because it forces organizations
to document that an analysis has been done and provide evidence that
supports any differential standard for behavioral health care. Adoption
of a similar standard by the NCQA is important, at a minimum, to ensure
a uniform accreditation standard for the first wave of qualified health
plan issuers. The limitations in the URAC standard—its failure to
articulate the precise information needed to satisfy the “reasoned
analysis” requirement, and its failure to evaluate the evidence of parity
compliance—should be addressed in future standards.
C.

PLAN DISCLOSURES FOR STATE CERTIFICATION

State insurance departments, as the entities with primary
enforcement responsibility over insurance issuers, are uniquely
positioned to ensure that health plans offered in their states comply with
the Parity Act, including those they must certify as qualified health plans
for sale in State Health Benefit Exchanges and the individual and small
group commercial markets. The Parity Act prohibits a group health plan
or health insurance issuer from selling a plan or policy that does not
comply with statutory and regulatory standards. 321 Just as state
insurance departments verify health plan compliance with other state and
federal laws and conduct rate reviews, 322 their plan review should
explicitly encompass an examination of parity compliance.
To facilitate that review, health plans should be required to report
key data points that are used for a parity compliance evaluation and
submit a compliance report. The following data and standards would
allow for a complete parity review:

1) The standards used to define which services constitute mental
health and substance use disorders and which constitute medical/surgical
services;

320

Id. at 338.
26 C.F.R. § 54.9812-1T(h) (Westlaw 2013); 29 C.F.R.§ 2590.712(h) (Westlaw 2013); 45
C.F.R. § 146.136(h) (Westlaw 2013).
322
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 11-206 (Westlaw 2012) (rate filing and review); id. §§
12-203, 12-205 (form filing and approval).
321
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2) A list of all mental health and/or substance use disorder benefits
(services) that are covered under the plan and those that are excluded
from coverage;
3) The standards for classifying mental health/substance use
disorder benefits and medical benefits as outpatient or inpatient services;
4) The source of the plan cost data used to determine the
“substantially all” and “predominant” standards for all financial
requirements and quantitative treatment limitations, and the relevant
values;
5) All cumulative financial requirements and treatment limitations
and verification that a single value is applied to both behavioral health
and medical benefits;
6) Annual and lifetime dollar limits that are placed on mental
health/substance use disorder benefits and medical benefits;
7) All non-quantitative treatment limitations (NQTLs) on health
service;
8) The processes used to develop each NQTL standard and the
factors that are considered in applying the NQTL to behavioral health
and medical benefits;
9) All clinical guidelines that are relied upon to justify a different
NQTL standard for behavioral health benefits;
10) Provider reimbursement rates for relevant Current Procedural
Terminology (CPT) codes and “usual and customary rates” for services
provided by out-of-network providers;
11) Standards for participation in provider networks;
12) Formulary rules for the coverage of medications used to treat
mental health and substance use disorders; and
13) The plan’s coverage exclusions.
The administrative cost of providing this information to a state
insurance department or other regulatory body would be minimal since
the plan should have gathered and evaluated it in preparation for offering
the plan.
The presentation of data points is an important addendum to the
checklist provided by the DOL Self-Compliance Tool for Part 7 of
ERISA. 323 One of the key barriers to enforcement is access to plan data
and information. Placing the essential information in the hands of the
state insurance department will provide a repository of information that a

323

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 173, at 27-29. The tool presents a series of questions
that track the regulatory requirements and, thereby, guide the plan through a checklist of items it
evaluates. It does, however, emphasize the need to document its NQTL analysis along the lines of
the URAC accreditation standard.
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plan participant can access if the plan refuses to disclose and that a state
consumer assistance unit can use to investigate a complaint
expeditiously. At least one state insurance department has required
insurance issuers to disclose information to demonstrate parity
compliance, 324 and Massachusetts’s recently enacted health care reform
bill will require all carriers to submit an annual, publicly available report
to the state insurance division and Attorney General, outlining how their
health benefit plans comply with the Parity Act. 325 Other states must
adopt Massachusetts’s standard to demonstrate a serious commitment to
enforcement.
The Parity Act and regulations effectively root out most “vestiges of
structural differences” 326 between behavioral health and medical benefits
in health insurance. Regulatory bodies must do much more, however, to
ensure that consumers understand their right to equitable health coverage
and have access to the information needed to enforce that right.
Mandatory demonstrations of parity compliance and disclosures of
essential plan information will ensure better health plan compliance and
oversight. Vigorous federal agency enforcement commensurate with
efforts made under other civil right statutes is also needed to effectuate
the Parity Act’s remedial goals.
CONCLUSION
National health care policy is moving decisively to integrate mental
health and substance use disorder services in mainstream health care.
The Affordable Care Act requires the coverage of behavioral health
services in the Essential Health Benefits “to remediate what [Congress]
saw as shortcomings in current coverage,” 327 and mandates that qualified
health plans include within their provider networks sufficient numbers of
behavioral health service providers so that care will be accessible without
unreasonable delay. 328 The ACA also recognizes the importance of early
identification of alcohol and drug use problems by including screening
requirements for alcohol misuse as one of the prevention services that
primary care practitioners must provide their patients without cost-

324

See supra note 232 regarding Nebraska Insurance Department disclosure form.
S.B. 2400, § 254, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2012).
326
Keith Dixon, Implementing Mental Health Parity: The Challenge for Health Plans, 28
HEALTH AFF. 663, 663 (2009).
327
INST. OF MED., supra note 123, at 61.
328
See 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a) (Westlaw 2013); USPSTF A and B Recommendations, U.S.
PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE, www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/uspstf/uspsabrecs.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
325
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sharing. 329 These standards should begin to transform the way the health
care system views and provides healthcare for persons with mental health
and substance use disorders. They (and their providers) will be a more
visible and, over time, less stigmatized population within the healthcare
system.
Arguably, comprehensive coverage of behavioral health conditions
would never have been adopted under the ACA had advocates not
succeeded in winning enactment of the Parity Act. The Parity Act
represents the primacy of science over timeworn stereotypes about the
origin and disease progression of substance use disorders. Once the
patterns of discriminatory insurance coverage were exposed and
remedied, it was possible for policymakers to put into place a full range
of research-based clinical standards for behavioral health care. The ACA
and the Parity Act work synergistically to require the inclusion of
behavioral health services on an equal basis with medical services.
The Parity Act and ACA’s behavioral health standards respond to
fiscal considerations as much as health imperatives. The cost of
untreated mental health and substance use disorders to the health care
system and employment sector is staggering. 330 As some astute
observers of health care delivery in the United States have suggested,
providing more and better-coordinated care for those who are the highest
consumers of costly health services 331 may be the most effective way to
reduce our nation’s unsustainable level of health care spending. 332

329

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713, 124 Stat. 119,
131 (2010).
330
Carter & Landau, supra note 1, at 45 (observing that employers will realize a very strong
return on investment by expanding access to mental health services, because mental illness causes
more work loss and impairment than many other chronic conditions, including diabetes, arthritis, and
asthma; estimating that cost of parity compliance is recouped by preventing one day of absenteeism
for an employee with an average salary of $50,000).
331
See Pamela L. Owens et al., Mental Health and Substance Abuse-Related Emergency
Department Visits Among Adults, 2007, at 1 (July 2010), available at www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/
reports/statbriefs/sb92.pdf (reporting that 12 million emergency department (ED) visits in 2007 (12.5
% of all ED visits) involved a diagnosis of a mental health or substance use disorder condition, and
nearly 41% of those visits resulted in hospitalization, 2.5 times the rate of hospitalizations for nonmental health/substance use disorder ED visits).
332
See Atul Gawande, The Hotspotters: Can We Lower Medical Costs by Giving the Neediest
Patients Better Care?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 2011, available at www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2011/01/24/110124fa_fact_gawande (describing the value of consistent, coordinated
healthcare and social services to improve the health and reduce hospitalization of an individual with
alcohol and cocaine dependence, congestive heart failure, chronic asthma, uncontrolled diabetes,
hypothyroidism, gout, and obesity). Stephen Melek, a principal and actuary with Milliman, has
advised insurance plans that “providing unlimited behavioral healthcare benefits at lower out-ofpocket costs for members could translate into overall health improvements, which could lead to
lower medical/surgical costs for these members over time.” Stephen Melek, Mental Health Parity—
Quantitative Treatment Limits, MILLIMAN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ADVISOR (Aug. 2010).
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Economic imperatives to reduce health spending 333 should ultimately
lead to the delivery of more comprehensive care for persons with mental
health and substance use disorders even if the Parity Act did not mandate
it. With the alignment of good science and good economics, behavioral
health care will blend more seamlessly into health care.

333

See Ezekiel J. Emanual, Spending More Doesn’t Make Us Healthier, N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR (Oct. 27, 2011, 12:53 PM), opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/spendingmore-doesnt-make-us-healthier/.
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